University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

12-2001

Base Closure Impacts and the General Effects of Military
Installations on Local Private Employment
Patrick E. Poppert
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Poppert, Patrick E., "Base Closure Impacts and the General Effects of Military Installations on Local
Private Employment. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2001.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/3640

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Patrick E. Poppert entitled "Base Closure
Impacts and the General Effects of Military Installations on Local Private Employment." I have
examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend
that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, with a major in Economics.
Henry W. Herzog, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Matthew N. Murray, Robert A. Bohm, Thomas P. Boehm
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Patrick E. Pappert entitled
"Base Closure Impacts and the General Effects of Military Installations on Local
Private Employment." I have examined the final paper copy of this dissertation
for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in
Economics.

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Vice Provost and
Dean of the Gradua

Base Closure Impacts and the General Effects of Military
Installations on Local Private Employment

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of T ennessee, Knoxville

Patrick Eugene Poppert
December 2001

Copyright

c

Patrick Eugene Pappert, 2001
All rights reserved

ii

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to
my wife, Teresa,
my children, Richard II and Rachel
and

to my parents, Richard and Marie Poppert

iii

ACKN OWLEDGMEN TS

There are a number of people to whom I am indebted for my
accomplishment at the University of Tennessee. First and foremost, are my
father, who gave me the push to go this far, and my mother, who gave me the gift
of writing.

I

am a lso grateful to a former supervisor, and good friend, James

Salter, for honing my research and writing skills. Many than ks go to Jackie
Crawford, Richard L'Heureux, and Mickey Dansby for their votes of confidence.
am particularly appreciative of my Dissertation Committee, Henry Herzog,
Matthew Murray, Robert Bohm, and Thomas Boehm for their encouragement
and support. The merit of this work is due in no small part to their guidance and
suggestions. Lastly, my greatest debt is to my wife, Teresa, for patiently
enduring the stress and challenges of graduate school and the monotonous
hours of my seemingly unintelligible discourse - she will always be my beacon in
stormy weather.

iv

ABSTRACT

This empirical study explores the general effects of military installations on
local employment, and the special case of closure under the Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) proceedings of 1 988, 1 991 , 1 993, and 1 995 . Employment
impacts are modeled in a partial adjustment construct, and both random and
fixed effects specifications of the disturbance term are evaluated. The analysis
also includes both levels and changes forms of the model. The latter approach
facilitates decomposition of defense personnel changes into its positive,
negative, and B RAC related components. These components are examined for
asymmetrical effects attributable to the public goods and community
infrastructure vacuum that is created when military installations draw down . The
specific effects of economic assistance, and facilities conversion and reutilization
in B RAC communities are also considered, as are the elasticities of defense
employment multipliers with respect to regional industry specialization and
military vs. civilian workforce composition. Two-stage least squares instrumental
variable techniques are employed to alleviate concerns over the relationship
between the lagged dependent variable and the disturbances .
A novel panel data set incorporating 21 years of military and private
industry observations for 963 military installations and 3,092 counties allows
comprehensive modeling and examination of defense related employment trends
across a ll 50 states. The collection of sub-county defense personnel figures
addresses a shortcoming of other county-level impact studies, which reconcile
v

community employment changes against base closure personnel losses, without
consideration of personnel dynamics at other military installations within the
same county.
The study finds evidence of an asymmetrical relationship between military
personnel level changes, and local community employment. While this supports
the proposition of favorable effects through reutilization of public and community
infrastructure, facilities, and housing when bases draw down, economic
assistance and the practice of outsourcing defense support functions are also
identified as contributors to this condition. Results of the study also suggest the
degree to which regional industry specialization and workforce composition
influence the effect of loca l defense employment on community employment is
minimal. The exception is the reutilization effects of B RAC related personnel
losses, which appear to be less favorable in counties with a strong military
presence.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement
"Because the Congress remains concerned about the local economic
effects of closing bases, it could request further study of that phenomenon
in order to provide an empirical perspective from which to consider
additional base closings."
- CBO, Closing Military Bases: An Interim Assessment, 1 996

Despite an estimated facilities reduction of 20 percent, or 464,000 acres
between the 1 988, '91 , '93 and '95 Base Rea lignment and Closure (BRAC)
rounds, the Department of Defense (DoD) continues to press for additional
infrastructure cuts (GAO, 1 998) . The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
Defense Reform Initiative, and National Defense Panel all conclude aggregate
military base capacity exceeds requirements of the strategy and force structure
laid out under QDR (OSD, 1 998) . Even the Congressional Budget Office notes a
disparity between existing troop levels and support structure capacity.
Specifically, they identified an unexplainable per capita facility square footage
increase of 3 3% from 1 988 to 1 997, despite already completed base closure and

reutilization actions (CBO, 1 996) .
1

In its 1 998 report to Congress, the Pentagon requested two more closure
rounds, detailing additional installation excess capacity of 23 percent, along with
compelling support for cutting this deadweight. In particular, readiness,
modernization, and quality of life were identified as areas compromised by
spreading budgets over unneeded facilities (OSD, 1 998) . Two years later, the
call for more BRAC rounds has gone unheeded. Concern over the regional
economic impact of B RAC is a likely roadblock to congressiona l authorization of
additional closures. Given the DoD's estimate of 236, 000 direct jobs and
1 20,000 indirect jobs permanently lost under the first four rounds, the implied job
loss multiplier of 1 .51 is probably at the heart of this concern. But any such
closure aversion is only as defensible as the impact estimates themselves. Post
closure studies suggest related impact estimates were exaggerated . A lack of
empirical analysis of military base employment effects is probably the cause for
this exaggeration. Without the benefit of econometrically derived multipliers,
impact estimates were based on less precise methods, such as expert opinion
and modified economic base and input-output techniques. A subsequent
discussion of economic base and input-output frameworks illustrates that when
either of these approaches is adapted to the military base setting, the underlying
assumptions often result in upward biased estimates.

Research Objectives

Under the four BRAC rounds completed thus far, both local and DoD pro
forma projections of economic consequences to the local communities painted
2

bleak, if not disastrous pictures. In fact, qualitative studies indicate actual results
overall were generally quite mild. Understandably, grassroots lobbying efforts
may have influenced some of the inflated forecasts. To some degree local
authorities and congressional representatives have incentives to make "their''
bases appear as the worst choice for closure relative to other bases under
consideration . But that aside, for reasons to be discussed, even objectively
derived military base impact multipliers are generally biased u pward and do not
provide for the possibility of asymmetrical private employment effects. In short,
current tools and practices artificially boost the cost side of benefit-cost studies
related to realignment and closure deliberations. Given recent political
resistance to the Secretary of Defense's seemingly wel l founded requests for
additional closure rounds, impartial and defensible empirical models that reflect
the regional economic consequences of closure are much needed. This study
developed around that need .
The objective of the proposed study is an employment impact analysis of
military base labor forces on local stateside communities in genera l, and more
specifically the impact of base closures resulting from the 1 988, '91 , '93 a nd '95
closure rounds. Of course the product of this ana lysis will be empirically derived
military base employment multipliers. Within the scope of this research, the
propositions outlined below will be examined .

3

Propositions

The following research propositions relate to the defense personnel and
base closure impact variables of interest in this study. Specifically, they address
the county level i mpact of military base employment in general; the potential
offsetting effects of facility reutilization; and local industry and population
characteristics that influence the degree of military employment impacts. In all
cases, the anticipated effect is on local private industry employment.

Proposition

(1): Increases in military base labor force levels spur

demand driven positive indirect employment effects in the surrounding
communities. 1 This baseline relationshi p h inges on two characteristics of military
installations. First, though much of an installation's support is organic, generally
it is not completely self-sufficient. Bases typically host a variety of contracted
services such as dining hall operations, construction, general facility
maintenance, and repairs. Regardless of where contracts are let, administered,
or paid, the contractors' onsite staffs are an increase in local employment and a
direct result of the bases' operations. Secondly, since military and federal civilian
employees often come from outside counties, they represent a boost in local
wage earners; and those with income consume, however modest their margina l
propensity to do so. Even the thriftiest must still satisfy the bare necessities of

1 With the exception of discussions related to Input-Output modeling, the terms "indirect
employment effects" and "indirect effects" are used loosely throughout this study to mean indirect
and induced effects combined.
4

food and shelter locally. This boost in local consumption generally translates to
additional, or induced local employment.

Proposition

(2): Decreases in base employment generally exert positive

indirect employment effects. I n other words, defense personnel downsizing whether it be BRAC related or routine - represents 'Job creation through job
destruction" opportunities for local communities. Specifica lly, while the overall
employment impact (i.e., direct plus indirect jobs) may be negative, supply side
factors related to freed labor and private infrastructure (e. g., developed
residential communities and industrial facilities) result in asymmetrical, or positive
net indirect effects. Expanded discussion of these factors and support for this
postulation are provided in the infrastructure and defense dynamics portions of
this study (reference discussions beginning on pages 38 and 43, respectively) .

Proposition

(3): The overall unfavorable employment impact of base

closure is mitigated to some degree by the public goods infrastructure vacuum
created through efforts to promote private reutilization of these otherwise idle
assets. The rationale for this proposition is discussed at length in the
infrastructure portion of the background (reference discussion beginning on page

38) .

Proposition

(4): Export driven regions are less sensitive to military base

indirect employment effects tha n those regions with relatively lower ratios of
5

basic to non basic activity. It stands to reason that highly specialized regions
export more, producing proportionally less for internal consumption. For these
regions, employment growth is determined to a greater extent by outside
demand . Therefore, employment effects of exogenous shocks, such as defense
workforce expansions or contractions, are less pronounced in specialized
regions. As an extreme example, personnel increases at a base located in a
largely export driven county, like one of those comprising the Detroit MSA, will
probably have only a small incremental i mpact since outside demand for
automobiles is the major determinant of employment for this region.

Proposition

(5}: The effects of military base employment changes are

relatively more pronounced in communities with proportionally smal ler non
defense labor forces. This is expected because small economies are typically
less developed and therefore not achieving their full potential for scale
economies. Therefore, as the ratio of base personnel to the local labor force
increases, the underlying effect of base employment changes on local
employment is likely to be stronger. Conversely, as this ratio decreases, defense
personnel employment effects are less pronounced. This distinction is
particularly important in the case of defense downsizing (ordinary or B RAC
related), when the local defense-to-labor force ratio is generally decreasing and
the value of the corresponding change variable is necessarily negative.
Consequently, the favorable employment pressures postulated in Proposition (2)
are less pronounced under this proposition when the actual signs of the observed
6

values are taken into account. The GAO's descriptive statistics hint at this
eventuality. Specifically, of the small BRAC communities, only 44 percent
reported employment rates above the 1 997 national average, as compared to 60
percent when all major BRAC sites (small and large) were considered . 2

2

Reference GAO (1 998).
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Chapter I I
BASE C LOSURES A N D ECONOMIC IMPACTS

The Need for Closure

Recognizing the DoD support structure was excessive given the services'
roles and missions, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara launched efforts in
the early 1 960's to reduce defense activities for 954 installations, to include
closure of 60 major bases (Lall and Marlin, 1 992). The process spanned 1 6
years and it wasn't always easy. As with all defense programs, reductions and
closures proceeded only when specific funding was authorized and appropriated
by Congress in response to the services' annual budget requests. Of course this
process left room for inefficiencies in the form of bill riders, political chit
redemptions, and logrolling. For those representatives who weren't successful in
protecting their constituents from a requested closure, the process was
sometimes politically painful . Not surprisingly, this ad hoc a pproach was
interrupted in 1 977 when the services were prohibited from unilaterally making
major realignments and adjustments to their supporting structure of military
installations. Specifically, at bases of 300 or more civil service employees,

8

U . S.C. Title 1 0, Section 2687 mandated Congressiona l approval for restructuring
actions that impacted more than 1 ,000 or half the resident federal workers.
At the height of U .S. involvement in Vietnam, the DoD employed 4 . 9
million military members and federal civilians. By 1 975, when active participation
in this conflict ended, the defense workforce numbered 3 . 2 million (see Figure 1
below) . Despite this 35 percent reduction in standing force and subsequent
changes in national objectives, U . S.C. Title 1 0 effectively precluded further
reductions to the defense infrastructure.
In 1 989 the Berlin Wall toppled . Just two years later, member states
regained their independence as the former Soviet Union all but dissolved. After

Historical Defense Personnel Levels
1 968-1 999

Ill
c

.�
·s:

CJ

5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5

Year

Figure 1

-

Defense Personnel Levels
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46 years of maintaining the military forces and arsenals necessary to support
Containment, Mutual Assured Destruction, and Detente foreign policies, the

United States watched the Cold War thaw. Having already anticipated the
withering of its greatest potential threat, the U . S. began work on a peace
dividend in the late 1 980s. The plan ca lled for another sizable reduction in DoD
personnel levels and military hardware inventories. U ltimately, this phased draw
down released 1 . 2 million defense employees from 1 988 through 1 999. Along
with these personnel actions, command structures were downsized; carrier
groups, divisions, a ir wings, and strategic forces were slated for reductions in
size or complete deactivation; and, weapons systems purchases were curtailed,
or "stretched" over longer delivery horizons. With the exception of Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, overseas presence was scaled back over this
same period. The political leadership was compelled to acknowledge fewer
stateside bases were required to sustain post-Cold War operations for a
department that was to shrink to 43 percent of its 1 968 manpower level. Under
the concept of scale economies, some form of military base consolidation and
closure was eminent. The tremendous burden of maintaining infrastructure with
excessive capacity needed to be lifted, or readiness and much needed weapons
modernization and quality of life programs would suffer.

Base Realignment and Closure Process

U nder the DoD force restructuring of the late 80's, the details regarding
personnel and program priorities were left to the military chiefs and service
10

secretaries for the most part. However, base closure and restructuring was
another matter. As implied by U .S.C. Title 1 0, concerns over base closure site
selection extended beyond departmental walls. Certa inly, the representatives of
small towns whose largest employer was the DoD had more than a passing
interest in the process of identifying stateside garrisons of 3,000 to 20,000 troops
for dissolution. Recognizing the inevitable, Congress authorized establishment
of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to inject integrity in
the process and preclude logrolling. 3
Essentially, the BRAC was designed as a body of nonpartisan members
whose charter was to: (1 ) solicit realignment/closure candidates along with
supporting facts and figures from the military services; (2) objectively evaluate
the services' recommendations, making changes where deemed appropriate;
and (3) forward the commission's recommendations to the President. The
President was restricted to disapproving the B RAC's proposal in its entirety, or
approving and forwarding it to Congress. The Congress was constrained
similarly; line item adjustments to the list were not allowed. If the Congress did
not push the proposal back to the B RAC Commission for reconsideration within
45 days of receipt, it became law. The services were given six years from
passage of the law to execute the approved closure plan (OSD, 1 998). 4

3 Since establishment of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, the acronym
BRAC, for "Base Realignment and Closure," has become the accepted reference to both the
commission and the process (e.g., "the 1 991 BRAC" or "BRAC '91 )
4 For the first BRAC (1 988), the commission itself was charged with identifying closure and
realignment candidates, and the Secretary of Defense and Congress were the final review and
approval authorities.
"
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The approved candidate selection criteria used by the DoD for its submissions to
the BRAC Commission are outlined in Figure 2. The first five criteria suggest
DoD mission requirements and cost considerations ranked well above economic
concerns. In fact, under the last two BRAC rounds, eight of the 61 major facilities
approved for reduction or closure were still endorsed despite the fact they were
located in "highly vulnerable" communities. 5 In general, the B RAC process
seems to have supported DoD's selection criteria and priorities over "not in my
backyard" politics. Bielling's 1 996 analysis of base closure selection dynamics
lends empirical support to this notion.

Direct Effects of Four BRA C Rounds6

The first B RAC convened in 1 988. Subsequently, Congress authorized
three additional BRACs; one each in 1 991 , 1 993, and 1 995. Between these four
rounds, a total of 261 stateside activities, to include 97 major installations, were
identified for reduction or closure (Siehl, 1 996) . 7 The mean net reduction through
September 1 998 was 4, 1 09 military and civil service employees per base, for a
tota l of 398, 592 personnel across all 97 insta llations. Losses at individual sites
5 In 1992, the Defense Conversion Commission designated areas with defense-related

employment of 20 percent or more nhighly vulnerable." 72 such areas (MSAs and counties) were
identified (Siehl, 1 996).
6 Sources for personnel figures are the fiscal year end Department of Defense Distribution of
Personnel by State and by Selected Locations (M02 Reports), for 1 987 through 1 998.
Accordingly, values presented here are as of September 30, 1 998, Due to instances where
adjustments were not complete by 1 998, these figures do not reflect final personnel levels under
BRAC.
7 For purposes of this study, a major BRAC facility, installation, or base is defined as one
employing at least 300 military and defense civilians in 1 987 or thereafter. The 97 sites deemed
major are listed in Appendix B .
12

Militai)' Value
1.

The current and future mission requirements and the impact on
operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.

2.

The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated
airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3.

The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future
total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving
locations.

4.

The cost and manpower implications.
Return on Investment

5.

The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure
or realignment, for the savings to exceed costs.
Impacts

6.

The economic impact on communities.

7.

The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities'
infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.

8.

The environmental impact.
Figure

2

-

DoD's BRAC Candidate Selection Criteria

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Repon of the
Depanment of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure.
Washington DC: OSD, April 1 998.
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ranged from less than 1 00 to as many as 1 9,800, with the median value being
2,937. Seventy of the major BRAC bases experienced losses of 1 ,000 or more.
In some cases, a given community hosted more than one installation . For
example, the 97 major BRAC bases fell within 88 counties (or 59 Metropolita n
Statistical Areas (MSAs) for the 70 BRAC counties associated with an MSA) .
Furthermore, a number of minor facilities affected by B RAC and a few major
bases experiencing restructuring outside the BRAC realm shared some of these
same communities. These co-located installations may have lost or gained
personnel. From the community perspective, the net defense personnel losses
through September 30, 1 998 averaged 4,529 at the county level, and 6, 756 per
MSA for the major BRAC localities. The hardest hit communities were Monterey
County, California and the Philadelphia PA-NJ Primary MSA (PMSA), with losses
of 1 9,800 and 33,005 respectively.
The fiscal savings under the four BRAC rounds are substantial. As part of
the DoD's major force reduction and reshaping measures, base closures have
contributed greatly to the overall reduction in defense spending. While White
House estimates place the savings of all these initiatives at 36 percent -- or $ 1 36
billion across eleven years beginning with 1 989 -- BRAC is expected to reduce
spending $57 billion over a 20-year window for its part (Siehl, 1 996) .

Indirect Effects of BRAC

At the time of this study, 9-1 0 years of post-BRAC data are available for
the first round, but only 2-3 years ca n be collected for B RAC '95 . Furthermore,
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the gates are still open at as many as 1 8 of the major BRAC bases slated for
realignment or closure. Consequently, little has been accomplished in the way of
rigorous, comprehensive examinations of BRAC impact on loca l communities .
However, there are a few qualitative assessments and limited empirical studies
that suggest the impact may have been short-lived and not as severe as
anticipated for a number of communities.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) examined closure impacts on local
communities, choosing rea l per capita income (PCI) growth rates, and
unemployment rates as the status indicators (GAO, 1 998). Of 62 communities
party to 88 major base closures, 60 percent had lower unemployment rates than
the national average at the start of BRAC (1 988), while that number improved to
68 percent by 1 997. With respect to PC I , 55 percent of 49 major B RAC locales
examined surpassed the national growth rate, while 41 percent exhibited
negative growth for the period 1 988 to 1 991 . 8 In contrast, 63 percent of these
same areas exhibited growth rates equal to or greater than the national rate from
1 991 to 1 995. Of the 1 8 communities with below national average rates, only
five reflected negative growth. An interesting point made in the study is that the
national average PCI growth rate was only 0.2 percent for 1 988 to 1 99 1 , whereas
the same rate for 1 99 1 to 1 995 was 1 . 5 percent. In other words, with respect to
PC I , a large number of the BRAC communities seem to have lead the national
economy in post-recession recovery.
8 Thirteen communities impacted by BRAC '95 were excluded in the GAO's PCI analysis since
data were not yet available.
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To test the idea that metropolitan areas withstand closure impact better
than smaller economies, the GAO compared deviations from aggregate U .S.
unemployment rates and PCI growth rates of the smaller closure communities
with the overall B RAC values. The resu lts are inconclusive . Only 44 percent of
the small communities had an unemployment rate below the 1 997 national
average, as compared to 60 percent when all major B RAC sites are considered .
But 71 percent of the rural sites had higher PCI growth tha n the national rate
(1 991 to 1 995), as compared to 63 percent when small and large B RAC
communities are combined .
Finally, the GAO provided a qualitative assessment based on a sample of
six BRAC sites visited. The localities were selected for their d iversity in
population, geography, and general economic conditions. Based on interviews
with community officials, the GAO concluded the impact of B RAC was less
negative than anticipated for these regions. "Though some communities
encountered negative economic impacts during the transition from the
announcement of base closure to recovery, local officials said they are optimistic
about the long-term outlook for their communities . . . they now view base closure
as an opportunity for their community to craft a new identity for itself and diversify
the local economy." Factors submitted by the GAO to explain the better than
expected outcome at most B RAC sites are summarized in Figure 3.
In general, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) also concluded
base closure impacts were not ruinous (Siehl, 1 996) . Of the 95 major BRAC
areas examined, only 33 had unemployment rates of 5.9 percent or higher for
16

Factors Affecting Economic Recovery from Base Closures

Economic
Recovery

Figure

3 - Economic Recovery Factors Suggested by GAO

Source: General Accounting Office. Military Bases: Status of Prior Base
Realignment and Closure Rounds. Washington DC: GAO, NSIAD-99-36,
1 998.

May 1 995. I nterestingly, a pattern was evident in these 33 communities.
Specifically, two-thirds fell in just three states {1 4 in California, five in Lou isiana,
and three in Texas) . Though not explicitly stated, the implication is once again
that non-BRAC economic factors may have the strongest role in deciding a given
community's fate. In either case, the report offers some optimism with regard to
closures, stating " . . . if reuse continues to show an increase in jobs, a reduction in
adverse effects from military neighbors (such as noise, overflights, etc.), and
redevelopment of military facilities that enhances communities, then
congressional opinion may favor additional financial savings through [more] base
closures ."
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As part of its 1 998 report to Congress, the DoD assessed the impact of
BRAC in terms of unemployment compensation to federal civilians (Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 1 998) . A sample of thirty major closure bases was
examined. The DoD found participation was approximately 1 4 percent of those
eligible to draw compensation. However, since some tracking offices served
multiple bases - BRAC and non-B RAC - and a number of
claimants were victims of the general defense draw down, the true figure was
likely something less than 1 4 percent. In either case, these results imply at least
86 percent of the affected federal civilian workforce either relocated within the
government, found non-federal employment, retired, or voluntarily chose not to
return to work.
For those former civil servants who drew benefits, the average length of
unemployment was 1 7 weeks. Weekly payments were around 73 percent of the
average maximum allowable amounts. Details were not available to explain the
deviation from maximum payments, but one possibility is the mandatory offsets
for temporary wage earnings of the displaced federal workers as they sought
permanent employment.
The DoD estimated total unemployment compensation payments to
federal civilians directly impacted by all four B RAC rounds would approach $90
million. This estimate covers a span of 1 4 years (FY88 through FY01 ) . I n
contrast, over the period FY94 through FY97, annual unemployment claims
reimbursements from the DoD to the states averaged $1 00 million. Ceteris
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paribus, BRAC related claims are expected to represent less than 1 /1 4, or 6.4
percent of all DoD unemployment claims.
The RAN D Corporation conducted a limited review of B RAC impacts on
local communities, and found that in general impacts were neither "catastrophic"
nor "as severe as forecasted" (Dardia, 1 996) . These conclusions were reached
through examination of three of California's largest B RAC bases: George Air
Force Base (AFB) in San Bernardino County, Castle AFB in Merced County, and
Fort Ord in Monterey County. The study focused on a number of descriptive
measures for the neighboring communities. Specifically, for the period 1 99 1 1 994 (1 989-1 994 in the case of George AFB), it considered changes in
populations, K-1 2 enrollments, labor force sizes, unemployment rates, taxable
reta il sales levels, local government revenues, availa ble housing units, vacancy
rates, and average home sales prices. The benchmarks for assessing economic
toll were various experts' predicted results; the economic status of a paired, or
matching non-BRAC installation for each of the three bases; and the experiences
of non-neighboring communities in the same counties as the three sites. Of
course the researchers provide the disclaimer that the study is too limited for
results to be extrapolated across all BRAC sites. N evertheless, it yields some
valuable insight.
With regard to the expert forecasts, in many cases the actual results were
appreciably more favorable than predicted . For example, while local K-1 2
enrollment was expected to decrease 30 and 50 percent at George and Castle,
respectively, George actually experienced positive growth, and the drop at Castle
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was closer to ten percent. Only city revenue and K-1 2 enrollment projections for
Fort Ord, employment figures for George, and the population forecast for Castle
were within five percent of actual outcomes. The latter was the only case where
results were less favorable than forecasted for the 1 2 comparisons made.
Under the paired-bases comparison, RAN D attempted to match nonBRAC bases having similar missions, personnel levels, and rural characteristics
with George, Castle, and Fort Ord . The counterparts were Vandenberg AFB,
Beale AFB, and Camp Pendleton, respectively. The matches were by no means
precise, but perhaps adequate enough to draw the very general conclusion that
the local economies probably would have experienced more favorable economic
conditions had the three bases not closed . The authors freely recognize their
study does not support conclusions about the degree of difference between
actual and hypothetical outcomes, and that it marginally supports statements
about the direction of these would-be metrics. But, a fairly reasonable inference
of their work is that the non-BRAC component of local economic trends may
overshadow BRAC related impacts. For example, all eight metrics for George
were approximately the same or significantly more favorable than those of
Vandenberg, even though George was the base that closed . 9
RAN D's final comparison was between economic conditions in the
immediate vicinity of George, Castle, and Fort Ord, and those of their respective
counties. In the latter two cases, the authors find general support for the
9

Comparative metrics were population, housing units, vacancy rates, unemployment, labor force,
city revenue, K-1 2 enrollment, and retail sales.
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expectation that the brunt of BRAC impacts are felt most at the sub-county level.
Specifically, for most of the metrics the local values were of the same sign but
lagged, or were less favorable than the county level figures. In the case of
George AFB, the local community a pproximated or led the county's performance
to a considerable degree. This unexpected outcome suggests that unrelated
regional factors may have a role in mitigating the negative impact norma lly
expected from base closure.

Economic Relief

Accommodation of the U nited States' long-term armed forces posture was
the DoD's primary focus during B RAC deliberations. But the closure process and
the parties involved were not oblivious to economic issues, particularly as they
related to recovery at the sites chosen. Though the military's proposals were
generally accepted, there were instances where recommendations were
overturned. For example, in 1 993, the Air Force's seemingly impa rtial and
objective eva luation of East Coast air mobility wing alternatives concluded
McGuire AFB, NJ should revert to reserve status with the remainder of the
mission transferring to Plattsburg AFB, NY. Yet, a study by Bernardi (1 996)
suggests that for no a pparent operational or cost rationale, the Commission
disregarded this assessment, and recommended Plattsburg close completely
while McGuire retain the mission. I n another instance, the 1 995 BRAC
Commission added the huge Air Force maintenance and repair depots at Kelly
AFB and McClellan AFB (San Antonio and Sacramento, respectively) to the
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closure list contrary to the Pentagon's wishes (Kitfield, 1 995) . Finally, in an effort
to a lleviate the layoff fears of some 1 8, 700 federal civilians at Kelly and
McClellan, the Pentagon and White House launched a "privatization in place"
initiative subsequent to B RAC 95 (Economist, 1 995) . The objective was to
preserve jobs for as many employees as possible while transferring ownership of
the depot operations to the corporate sector. Ideally, the depot personnel would
leave work as civil servants one day, and return the next day as defense
contractor employees . Cases like these were exceptions to the rule. But they do
suggest that parties on all sides of the B RAC table were not completely
insensitive to economic impacts in closure communities.
To explicitly address economic concerns after BRAC recommendations
were approved, the Office of Economic Adjustment (O EA) under the Secretary of
Defense was charged with facilitating resource conversion and reutilization. In
fact, a selling point for a number of closure candidates was that these assets
(mil itary land areas and in some cases, structures) could be released to the local
government and commercial sectors, to the benefit of the effected communities.
As Secretary of Defense William Perry noted in the preface to the Community
Guide to Base Reuse, "When we must close or cut back one of our military

installations, we do it with great regret. But we also do it with great interest in
seeing the lands and facilities reborn as new additions to a community's
economy, job base and quality of life . . . " To that end, the OEA has followed the
services' preparation of sites for transfer; overseen the marketing of these sites;
assisted community leaders in their organization and planning for transition;
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administered relief in the form of cash grants; and tracked direct jobs created as
a result of these efforts.
As of February 1 998, the OEA provided $231 million in grants across the
major BRAC locations (GAO, 1 998) . Though the OEA has held the primary role
in reuse, three other federal agencies joined in providing financial assistance to
BRAC communities: the Economic Development Administration (EDA), the
Department of Labor (DOL), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Through 1 997, these three groups provided another $81 6 million in cash grants,
for a tota l of $1 . 047 billion toward relief and reutilization (GAO, 1 998) . 10 These
relief funds are directly tied to BRAC, and tracked accordingly. The CRS claims
Congress has provided more than $ 1 0 billion in total financial assistance (Siehl,
1 996) . However, some of the uses actually fall under the broader umbrella of
defense draw down relief (e.g., transition assistance for displaced DoD workers,
defense industry conversion assistance, etc.).
Additional assistance was provided to BRAC communities in the form of
conveyance relief. Specifically, the initial intent of the DoD was to parcel out land
and facilities at closed sites to local development authorities for fair market value.
The expected revenues were even factored into the cost-benefit analysis
submitted to the B RAC Commission, and subsequently included as offsets in the
BRAC budgets for facility preparation, cleanup and closure (Brown, 1 989; OSD,
10

While grants from the other three agencies were spread over most the major BRAC
communities to help with reuse planning, infrastructure development, and worker retraining, the
FAA's $271 million contribution was targeted to 27 sites which offered benefits like improved air
traffic control and decreased route congestion.
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1 998) . However, in response to local civic leaders' complaints about expenses
and unduly long delays in transfer, the emphasis shifted from obtaining fair va lue
to expediting the release of these assets (CBO, 1 996) . For example, in 2000,
under Congressional authority, the Air Force is expected to forgive as much as
$1 00 million of the Kelly Greater Development Authority's land conveyance debt
for property on the B RAC listed Kelly AFB in San Antonio (Air Force Times,
2000) .
According to the OEA's

1 988, 1 99 1, 1 993 and 1 995 BRAG Actions Base

Reutilization Status report, through March 1 999, new leases and deeds resulting

from reuse activity a mounted to 1 , 262 and 1 24, respectively for the 77 stateside
reuse sites tracked. Additiona lly, post-B RAC reutilization measures generated
53,91 9 new direct jobs. Federal civilian job losses for these same locations were
1 35,84 7 . The annual DoD Distribution of Personnel by State and Selected
Locations reports indicate the corresponding military personnel losses were

approximately 1 96,029. I n short, reutilization has generated 1 new directjob for
every 6 federal jobs lost.

Empirical Examinations of Closure Impacts

H ooker and Knetter (1 999) employ a counterfactual approach to analyzing
the impact of base closures, contrasting actual county level employment and PCI
growth rates with those that would have occurred (1 ) had the county measures
continued to grow at their respective state's rate; and (2) had the ex post margin
between county and state measures mirrored that of the pre-closure period . The
24

differential is assumed to represent the jobs lost or PCI change as a result of the
closures. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to estimate overall job loss
multipliers (the dependent variable being jobs lost under the counterfactual
scenarios, and the independent variable being direct defense jobs lost through
closures) . Establishing 't as a given base's year of closure, a single independent
variable regression is run for every combination of the following: employment as
the independent varia ble; the independent variable measured at 't,
3, and 't

+ 4;

t+l,

't

+ 2,

't

+

the dependent variable measured under the sustained state growth

rate scenario; and the scenario assumed to begin at 't 1 and 't
-

,

-2

(total of 20

equations) . Similar regressions are run for the sustained growth rate differential
scenario. In an analogous fashion, PCI change multipliers are a lso estimated .
The greatest explanatory power is provided in the job loss model, with the
counterfactual baseline beginning at

't

-

2,

under the matching county-state

growth rate scenario. 1 1 All five of the individually estimated coefficients Oob loss
multipliers) are highly significant and their corresponding models yield R2 values
ranging from 0.46 to 0 .63. Of greater interest is that for 't

=

1 through 4, the

multipliers are between 0.90 and 0.97, and they do not test significantly d ifferent

11

As the authors note, the relatively stronger results under a t 2 baseline vs. t 1 reinforce the
notion that closures were either gradual or anticipated. With respect to counterfactual
assumptions, of 57 observations, 22 were lost under the sustained growth rate differential
scenario. Based on additional testing, the author's identify potential sample selection problems
with this scenario, and therefore suggest the sustained state growth rate scenario is a preferable
approach.
-
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from 1 at the five percent level . 1 2 This implies that for the first four years
following closure (and presumably indefinitely thereafter) the only impact is the
direct base job loss. Under the t -1 baseline, the multipliers are even smaller. In
either case, since all the estimated multipliers have va lues less than 1 , the
results suggest closure county employment actually grew at a faster rate than
that of the state, providing " . . . evidence of indirect or induced job creation!"
These findings lend credence to the idea that base closures may present
opportunities to local economies in the form of an infrastructure vacuum. It is
worth noting Hooker and Knetter test for nonlinear relationships between
counterfactua l county job loss and base employment loss, finding no evidence of
its existence. Furthermore, they obtain an unexpected negative sign from
interaction between the shock and a rural dummy variable, but the effect tests
insignificant.
Regarding PC I, the authors find closures h ave little impact. At first glance
this seems odd given the other results imply employment losses are restricted to
just the direct base jobs lost. Though the military base self-sufficiency argument
goes a long way toward balancing these two outcomes, there is still some
propensity on the part of base employees to spend downtown. This off-base
income is forever lost when the base closes and the employee is transferred. If
off-base employment does not change, the region's PCI should decrease --

12

At t =0, b =0.69 and the hypothesis that b =1 is rejected at the five percent level. The authors
offer no explanation, though it is likely this is because assigned personnel were not relieved of
duty en masse on the first day of the reported closure year.
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unless the mean PCI for base employees is below that of the surrounding
community. This is exactly the reconciliatory explanation offered by Hooker and
Knetter. On average the PCI for military members is below that of their civilian
neighbors (as much as 1 /3 lower) . If it is assumed that junior civilian base
employees are more a pt to out-migrate than their senior peers with stronger ties
to the region, the same may be said for these young civil servants who depart the
region. This provides a boost to the PCI average for those remaining in the area,
offsetting the decrease from lost income.
Hooker and Knetter acknowledge some unresolved issues in their base
closure review. Specifically, as noted earlier in this study, assistance provided by
the OEA and other government agencies may have had a role in mitigating the
effects of defense job losses. In fact, for every six direct jobs lost under BRAC,
the OEA takes credit for creation of one new permanent job under its reuse a nd
reutilization efforts (OEA, 1 999) . The second concern involves the possibility of
self-selection bias if regional adaptability was a consideration in the base
selection criteria, even if such consideration was not openly acknowledged by the
parties involved . However, as they indicate, it is likely any such bias is small
given a fair number of bases in "vulnerable" communities were still selected .
Krizan (1 998) uses a comprehensive establishment-level panel data set
covering all private employment in California (1 989-1 996) to examine effects of
military base employment in that state, at the level they are most expected to
occur. Specifically, Krizan models establishment net employment growth rate as
a function of net defense personnel changes for bases within defined radii of the
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establishment; the ratio of base personnel to local labor force, for bases within 50
miles of the establishment; and, the establishment's age and size. Dummies are
included to control for other economic factors (i.e., the establ ishment's industry
classification; the SMSA where the establishment is located; whether the
establishment is a single-unit business, or part of a multi-unit company; and, the
year of observation) . 1 3 Annual changes in defense personnel levels for all
California bases (BRAC and non-BRAC) are incorporated in the data set.
Establishment-level observations are drawn from the Census Bureau's Standard
Statistica l Establishment List, which contains comprehensive multi-sector
microdata for all lawful concerns having positive payroll. Krizan's final data set
was compiled from approximately 4. 7 million observations.
I n light of the descriptive and limited empirical studies a lready discussed,
the results of Krizan's exa mination are not surprising. The coefficients for the
effects of net base employment changes on establishment growth rates have the
expected positive signs, and are significant, but quite sma ll. Specifically, at all
the establishment-to-base distances, the change in growth rate per employment
change of 1 ,000 base workers is well under 1 %. 1 4 Included in the regression
model is an interaction variable to assess the relative importance of military
installations to their local economy (the product of base personnel change and
the ratio of base personnel to private sector labor force) . At a ll but the 5 mile
13 These control dummies are used throughout the analysis. Related details are not presented in
the study. However, Krizan does state there are no unexpected patterns in these variables.
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radius, the effects are significant, but negative, suggesting private sector
employment in rural or small town environments is less likely to contract with
base draw downs. As noted, this is counter to the common belief that base
closures will have a greater negative impact on smaller communities. It may be
that a large share of the rural California communities hosting bases also rely on
agriculture as their primary basic activity. Since food exports are not likely to be
correlated with local defense activities, production for these agricultural
communities should be fairly immune from exogenous base closures.
Krizan a lso runs a second model that employs the absolute values of
esta blishment net growth rates as the dependent variable. The idea here is to
measure the degree of "churning," or resource reallocation for business entities
potentially effected by base closures. 1 5 I n this variation, the coefficients for base
employment changes are a lso positive and significant, implying churning
decreases with drops in base personnel levels. Furthermore, the coefficients
diminish with distance . Together, these results suggest the decrease in churning
associated with base closures is more pronounced for esta blishments closest to
the bases. To better understand this outcome, Krizan uses pro bit models to
examine establishment births and deaths as a function of the same factors.
14 Establishment-to-base distance measures are at 5 mile increments, from 0 to 50 miles.
Between o and 50 miles, the effects range from 0.0% to 0.6% with no apparent distance-related
trend.
15 In the author's words, churning is . . both expansion and contraction of continuing
establishments' employment levels as well as the opening and closing of whole plants. Such
transfers of resources can be an essential component of economic growth by facilitating the
adoption of new technology . . . and enhancing productivity growth through a process of 'creative
destruction.'" However, churning also imposes an economic cost in the form of frictional
unemployment. This is the cost Krizan is attempting to assess.
n

.

29

Regarding births, the coefficients are positive and decreasing with distance,
implying the probability of new births decreases with base personnel losses,
particularly closer to the base. Coefficients for the interaction term (base
personnel change x ratio of base personnel to private sector labor force) are
negative at distances below 40 miles, and positive for greater distances.
Together, these results suggest under closure conditions, new births are most
likely in smaller military communities, closer to the base.
Results for the establishment deaths probit model are tough to interpret.
Only half the coefficients are significant, and the coefficients vary in sign
depending on distance. If any conclusion can be drawn, it's that establishments
farther away are more likely to close with the installation than are those closer to
the base. Ca lling on the work of Dardia, et. al. (1 996), Krizan suggests retirees
may help explain this phenomenon . Specifically, military retirees often plant
their roots in communities which host bases to take advantage of medica l
benefits and relatively lower prices at the commissaries and base exchanges
(both of which are exempt from collecting state sales taxes) . When the base
closes, retirees must shift their patronage for these goods and services to the
local economy. This helps explain the overal l dampened impacts of closures.
The role of distance may also be explained, in part, by diminishing housing
opportunities close to the base for active duty military members. This is
conceivable given the propensity of military retirees to gravitate around bases,
and the more permanent nature of the retiree's domicile (i.e., military members
typically transfer every 2-3 years) . Displaced by a steadily expanding retired
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population, the relatively turbulent base workforce gradually accepts longer
commutes to work. When the base shuts down and the base employees
dissipate, it is the farther reaches of the local area that are most effected . Of
course the fact that the O EA actively promotes reutilization of closed defense
facilities may also help explain seemingly counterintuitive results related to
distance.
When Krizan runs the same models weighted for employment (vs. the
establishment orientation), he finds local labor force employment prospects
improve with base personnel losses (the effect being more pronounced in small

towns) . Aga in, the military retiree hypothesis is submitted . To test this
hypothesis, Kriza n runs the models separately for employment growth rates in
the Food Stores SIC, the General Merchandise Stores SIC, and all other non
reta il industries combined . For the most part, the coefficients are negative and
significant, though the magnitudes are appreciably greater in the two retail SI C's.
These results corroborate the shift in patronage theory.

Impact Multipliers and Self-Sufficiency

As noted in a CRS study, "Military bases were often designed to be self
sufficient and intentionally separate from the surrounding community" (Siehl,
1 996) . This self-sufficiency characteristic of military installations tends to limit the
indirect and induced impacts of draw downs and closures. In support of this
notion, Brauer and Marlin (1 992), and Dardia et. a l . (1 996) hint at factors such as
the tendency for active duty military to occupy government provided housing and
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consume goods provided through the base, (e.g., recreation service, legal
support, organized worship, and health care) at little or no cost to themselves.
The composition of the federal civilian workforce is a contributing factor as well.
Specifically, veterans receive hiring preferences and prior military experience is
often a desirable credential for defense civil service employment. Consequently,
some defense civilians also have military retirement benefits entitling them to
some of those same on-base privileges.
A simplified example may illustrate in part why military base closure
impacts are limited relative to other regional shocks. Think of a military base as
a fortress island connected by bridge with its host community. All civilians live on
the mainland, while a large portion of the military employees and their families
live on the island . Given the availability of low or no cost consumption on-base,
military families obtain a substantial portion of their needs on the base, even if
they reside on the mainland. Some of the federal civilians have military retiree
benefits and therefore obtain a portion of their needs on-base too. The
remainder of their needs, and that of all other federal civilians and contractors are
met off base. Assume local civilian PCI equa ls or exceeds that of federal
civilians, which equals or exceeds that of military members . 1 6 The host
community's regional employment multipliers for military personnel should be
less than those of federal civilians, which should be less than those of defense
contractors and all other civilians. This ordina l relationship is reflected in the

16 Hooker and Knetter (1 999) find some support for this assumption about relative incomes.
32

Pentagon's use of generic rural and urban multipliers to a pproximate those of
military and defense civilian employees: 1 .2 and 1 .8, respectively (Brauer and
Marlin, 1 992). Outside researchers have given recognition to this pattern in their
multiplier assumptions as well. For example, Lall and Marlin (1 992) use 1 .2, 1 .8,
and 2.5 for military. defense civilian, defense contractor multipliers, respectively,
in their state-level defense industry impact analysis.
Self sufficiency helps explain in general why military base closure shocks
can be expected to be smaller than other regiona l shocks. But, forecasts of
shock-induced growth or decline involve hard numbers, often computed from
economic base or regional input-output (1-0) multipliers. Therefore,
understanding the favorable differential between actual impacts and what many
projected for base closures also requires a look at the assumptions underlying
the derivation of these multipliers.

Closures in an Economic Base or Input-Output Framework

I n the context of an economic base framework, it is common to view the
activities of the military base as wholly basic. This goes back to the public goods
concepts of joint consumption, nonexcludability, free-riding, and willingness to
pay. Because price will not serve as an effective mechanism for allocating
defense, the individual town, county, or MSA by itself has virtua lly no impact on
the demand for defense. Only the collective voice of all communities determines
the appropriate level supplied. This collective voice is represented by the federal
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government. 1 7 Hence, from the local community perspective, the demand for
nationa l security is generally held to be exogenous, or basic. On the surface,
then, the local impact of closing a base is (b + n)/b, where b is basic (export
driven) industry, n is nonbasic industry, and base employment is a component of
b. By way of example, if base employment is 4,000, employment for the

remaini ng basic i ndustry is 6,000, and nonbasic employment is 7,000, the
multiplier is (b + n)/b = [{4,000

+

6,000)

+

7,000]/ {4,000

+

6,000)

=

1 . 7 . But this

presumes the base consumes nonbasic goods and services in the same
proportion as the region's remaining basic industries. There is good reason to
believe that is not the case. Specifically, bases typica lly provide much of their
own support, or nonbasic activities, even though these activities are considered
basic under the exogenous good of defense. At most bases, these organically
provided support activities include, but are not limited to roads, grounds, housing
and other infrastructure maintenance services provided through the civil
engineering squadron; law enforcement for the base and its residents; operations
related warehousing and retail services provided through base supply; hospitals,
legal, chapel, and counseling services for military personnel and their families;
etc. In contrast, many of these functions are truly nonbasic for off-base industry.
As such, actual base-related nonbasic activity should be proportionally less than
that suggested by regional economic base multipliers. Intu itively, then, base
closure impact estimates derived from regional multipliers are likely overstated -

17 See Mueller (1 996) for a more thorough discussion on collective provisioning of public goods.
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in part from use of an inflated multiplier, and in part from its a pplication to an
inflated basic shock (recall, the multiplier is a pplied to the entire base
employment loss, not just the truly basic portion) .
Within the Input-Output (1-0) context, the 1-0 table design explicitly places
military bases in the final demand portion of the table, under the exogenously
determined government sector. The effects of changes in this sector (direct
effects) on the endogenous interindustry and household sectors (indirect and
induced effects) are the subject of base closure impact analysis. Specifica lly,
besides the employment of base personnel, the base has an indirect impact on
the loca l economy through loca l base contracts and purchases, and an induced
impact through the local spending of household income generated from the direct
and indirect jobs. Being exogenously determined, the direct effect is given: it is
the number of military and federal civilian positions removed through rea lignment
or closure. It is the indirect and induced effects that must be estimated .
Existing 1-0 tables focus primarily on the interregional relationships,
interindustry dependencies and household demand. Defense operations are
only broadly addressed in the exogenous government sector, if at all. In practice,
multipliers are developed by either fitting military bases into the economic base
framework (potential pitfalls already discussed), or piggybacking on existing 1-0
industry multipliers to meet current needs. As an example of the latter, analysis
guidelines under the most recent B RAC round required the use of standardized
multipliers adapted from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) produced
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Regional Input-Output Modeling System {RIMS 1 1).18 In essence, multipliers for
the "general" installations and the "specialized" bases categorized as depots,
research and development bases, and a mmunition production facilities were
empirically inferred from a cross-section of multipliers for SIC "equivalents,"
across 53 regions. Because the objective was to develop a consistent cost
analysis approach that did not understate impacts, the guidance acknowledges
that the underlying assumptions result in multipliers that intentionally overstate
impacts . 1 9 However, even correcting for these assumptions, gross impact
estimates are likely to be overstated for reasons analogous to those discussed
under base closures in an economic base framework. Specifically, in any study
founded on analogy, it may be a stretch to presuppose privately owned
enterprises exact the same indirect and induced effects on the local economy as
"similar" government run operations. Consider the Air Force depot which by
analogy is probably best approximated by the aircraft and aircraft parts
manufacturing SICs. Certainly, the core operations are very similar. Both groups
buy, manufacture, distribute, repair, and service aircraft or aircraft components.
But in reality, the aircraft SIC multipliers are likely to be higher than those of their
government brothers because, once again, bases typically provide much of their
18 Guidelines and an overview of multiplier derivation are contained in the Economic Impact

Database, 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (1 995).
19 For example, base related induced consumption is assumed to be permanently removed when
the base closes. However, some displaced workers find employment locally, and still others
retire in the area and continue spending. For these individuals, local off-base services take the
place of services previously obtained through the base (e.g., health care). Assumptions
regarding the equation used to fit the data, and explicit upward adjustments to the estimated
multipliers are also sources of impact overestimation under this particular guidance. In short, the

(continued on next page)
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own support, or "indirect" activities, even though these activities are considered
"direct" along with the core function of the base for regiona l l -0 purposes. So
when a depot shuts down, the vehicle fuels section of supply and the chaplain's
staff are counted as direct impacts, yet off base their equivalents are indirect and
induced losses if Lockheed downsizes. To exacerbate this disconnect, when the
larger private industry based multiplier is applied to the depot, it is applied to an
inflated base that includes medical support, law enforcement, the vehicle fuels
section, the chaplain, and many others.
The implications of economic base and 1-0 approaches to base closure
impact analysis are evident in the disparity between actual and projected
impacts. When bases were under review for inclusion in the various BRAC
rounds, impact projections forwarded to the committee were often gloomy, if not
catastrophic. As Dardia (1 996) suggests, a number of these estimates may have
been tainted since they were conducted under grassroots efforts to lobby against
closure. But, even given the benefit of the doubt, it is likely local ana lysts
employed some form of economic base factor or adapted 1-0 multiplier. And, as
the examples above illustrate, there is a strong possibility even the most
objective of studies included inappropriate multipliers, appropriate multipliers
applied to the wrong base, or both. Other than cases of simple neglect or
arbitrary speculation, it is difficult to conceive of a scenario where any one of
these oversights could produce a downward biased impact estimate . Yet, given
resulting 1-0 multipliers generate relative vulnerability indices rather than true impact
assessments.
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that actual impacts were lower than most anticipated, the development and
application of upward biased multipliers is not only possible, but likely.

Infrastructure's Role in Limiting Impacts

The descriptive and empirical studies reviewed thus far allude to industry's
reuse of freed public resources, both on and off base, as a possible explanation
for better than expected post-B RAC regional economies. Recent findings in the
fiscal policy field also support the idea that reutilization opportunities in the form
of idle public infrastructure may have a significant role in mitigating the impacts of
base closures. Specifically, fiscal policy studies often focus on determining if a
causal relationship can be established between public goods provisioning and
regional growth. There are two principal reasons why such a relationship may
exist. From the individual's perspective, public goods may serve as amenities
that entice inmigration . 2° From the view of the firm, economies of scale under
public provisioning may translate to low cost factors of production (e.g., water
delivery, sewer and waste removal, highways and ports for shipping, etc) . In
either context, the base closure and reuse process may be viewed as surrogate
public expenditures. In a reutilization capacity, the bases represent an injection
of ready- or near ready-to-use infrastructure; from roads and grounds, to utilities,
telecommunications, plant and equipment. Furthermore, when a base population
vacates, a public goods vacuum is created in the surrounding communities which
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provided the schools, police and fire protection, developed residential areas,
highways, and public utilities necessary to host their DoD neighbors. Therefore,
if BRAC did not invoke severe hardship on local communities as studies seem to
indicate, the fiscal policy literature may offer some useful insight into why this
may be the case.
In a study of local economies, Eberts (1 991 ) empirical ly examines the role
of publicly provided infrastructure in promoting metropolitan economic growth.
By breaking down public expenditure into the categories of new investment (i .e.,
additions to capital stock) and maintenance of existing public capita l, he develops
support for the intuitive notion that it is new investment in infrastructure, and not
gross public expenditures that spurs growth. From the amenity and margina l
productivity standpoint, it may be that increased public capital stock per capita is
a necessary condition for promoting employment growth. E mpirically, E berts
finds support for this conclusion. He also finds public expenditures to susta in
existing infrastructure are not significantly correlated with regional growth. This
presents a dilemma for many communities. Since local budgets are
constrained, they must balance their need to arrest or slow the deterioration of
existing infrastructure with their need to build for tomorrow's economic growth. I n
older communities, the more immediate need for sustainment often wins out. For
example, Eberts notes that in 1 985 only two cents of every public dollar
expended on Cleveland's infrastructure actua lly went toward new capita l .
2°

For example, Herzog and Schlottmann (1 986) find recreational features, low crime rates, and
accessibility to educational opportunities are significant migration determinants.
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Though residents may prefer the improved economic conditions growth offers,
efforts to increase the new investment vs. sustainment ratio meet resistance
since these measures come as a sacrifice or an added expense to those same
residents. However, as suggested above, military base reuse may represent a
low or no cost alternative to new investment.
Fox a nd Murray (1 991 ) explore the effects of sub-state fiscal policies on
industry dynamics, focusing on new entries or growth in existing businesses
related to local public revenue structure, expenditure patterns, and infrastructure.
They find that specific changes to tax rates and expenditures have little impact
on firm startups and location decisions in the near-term. It is only through the
long run impact of a variety of policies that local governments can hope to see
enhanced economic growth. Though economic climate and the cost of labor and
transportation overshadow local revenue and expenditure policy as firm entry
determinants, infrastructure and education are identified as two public sector
vehicles with potential to significantly impact development. Again, freed
resources under base closures may approximate new spending in either or both
these areas.
Papke's 1 991 examination of industry responsiveness to state tax
differentials finds that industry location decisions are influenced by these
differences at the state level. Specifically, taxes have the expected inverse
relationship with both business starts and expansions. More importantly, from
the provisioning side she concludes the location decision for some industries
appears to be positively influenced by differences in public expenditures. These
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findings suggest new infrastructure with little or no new accompanying
expenditure should result in favorable conditions for regional growth .
Dalenberg and Partridge (1 995} explicitly address the twofold impact of
infrastructure on employment discussed earlier: as an amenity to workers (and
firms}, and as an unpaid input in the production process. At the MSA level, they
find that revenue and expenditure policies significantly influence total
employment levels. I n particular, both lower taxe� and increased expenditures
on public education have positive effects on employment growth .
When Dalenberg et. al. (1 998) revisit the role of infrastructure in regional
employment growth, they attempt to corroborate or counter the findings of recent
state-level research, which suggests that public capital has little influence on
output. They find flaws with previous studies that use production function or cost
function approaches to measure the effects of public spending on output.
Inherent problems with these approaches include difficulties measuring state
output; nonexistence of state-level price deflators; potential for inputs and outputs
to be model driven; accounting for spillover effects; inability to capture indirect
effects (e.g., infrastructure as a paid/unpaid production input; as an amenity that
attracts workers; and as a synergistic effect on the productivity of other inputs);
etc. To address these concerns, Dalenberg and company look at the direct
effect of infrastructure on employment. Some distinct advantages of this a ngle
include enhanced reliability of data; absence of the need to normalize prices; and
ability to control for varying state characteristics (e.g., demographics, industry
structure, and noninfrastructure amenities) . The study considers both highway
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expenditures, and public spending net of highway expenditures vs. changes in
employment. In both cases a significant positive relationship is evident. 2 1
Finally, in an effort to explain the outmigration of manufacturing from the
"Rust Belt" to the South, Crandall (1 993) attributes most of the shift to wage
differentials and the degree of unionization. However, he a lso identifies
infrastructure as h aving a significant influence during the period 1 97 7 through
1 989. Regarding policy prescriptions to ease the losses from the North, his work
suggests public capital may have a valid role to play in workforce and industrial
retention .
The implication of the preceding studies is that reutilization potential may
be a mitigating factor in the impact of base closures on local economies. Just
like new public goods expenditures, freed up public capital can be an a menity or
a factor of production that promotes inmigration a nd regional growth. As an
obvious example, consider the closure of a base with an operable airfield, like
Chanute AFB in Springfield, IL. In a municipal capacity, the a irport offers many
attractive features, to include freight handling and movement, transportation
convenience, access to markets, and relief to already congested a irports and
routes servicing neighboring communities. Even the less obvious examples of
installations with little more than land to offer represent reuse potential in the
form of public parks and recreation areas.

21

With regard to production and cost function approaches to examining infrastructure's role,
Dalenberg et. al. (1 998, p. 46) attribute the differences in results to the failure of those techniques

(continued on next page)
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Defense Dynamics and Labor Redistribution

County level effects of base realignments and closures, or defense
downsizing in general, may be less than disastrous or even beneficial when one
considers defense accession and attrition dynamics. Specifically, only one of six
counties in the United States has a defense presence. Excluding counties with
less than 300 defense employees, this number drops to one in nine . During
periods of defense expansion, these 348 counties draw defense workers, or
recruits from across all 3,092 counties nationwide. Granted, defense counties
likely contribute a greater than average share of this labor since the local
installations serve to influence potential military recruits and offer nearby
employment to prospective civil servants. But even so, a substantial percentage
of DoD employees are recruited from outside defense counties. Many of these
individuals do not return to their original home of record when they leave service.
Given the psychic costs related to job search and relocation, a fair number
remain in the area of their last duty station and assimilate into the local labor
force. This is especially true in an era of outsourcing and privatizing, when
former defense employees find their skills are highly valued and sought after
locally. What's more, military retirees generally exhibit a trend of settling near
installations to take advantage of base related benefits as they begin second
careers. In short, defense business cycles serve to redistribute the supply of
private labor. The result is often supply driven regional growth.

to recognize the " . . . amenity role of public infrastructure in attracting capital and labor."
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Chapter Ill
METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Impact Model Design

An empirical regression based approach is used to test anticipated
relationships against a panel data set spanning 1 978 through 1 99 7 . County level
non-farm private industry employment is the dependent varia ble. 22 The
independent variables include defense personnel levels for all stateside
installations (BRAC and non-BRAC) plus related characteristics, and peripheral
regional factors, or control variables that influence county-level employment. The
defense variables are the central focus of the study, and they are modeled as the
direct effects, or exogenously determined employment changes, congruent with

views held in practice. In using private employment as the left-hand side
variable, only the indirect effects of military base employment changes are
captured in this figure. The results yield multipliers that differ somewhat from
those obtained through analogy and adaptation of existing industry data, but the
methodology is more defensible. The results of this study complement the

22 Appendix A contains a variation of the final model of this study, where the dependent variable
is per capita income rather than employment.
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findings in Krizan's 1 998 longitudinal study, which was confined to modeling
realignment impacts in California only.

Levels and Changes Dynamic Models of Employment Impact

Causal analysis of regional employment as a function of local military
employment can be examined with the change in regional employment as a
function of the change in military employment (the "Changes" model) . It can also
be modeled with the change in regional employment as some function of the
level of military employment (the "Levels" model) . Finally, it can be modeled with
the level of regional employment as a function of the level of military employment
(the "Levels/Levels" model) . In the case of a dynamic model, with a lagged
dependent variable, the "Levels" and the "Levels/Levels" models yield the same
estimates since both forms minimize the same prediction error. As such, this
study narrows the choice to that of a "Changes" or a " Levels/Levels" model
(herein referred to as Changes and Levels, respectively) . Bartik (1 991 ) presents
a good review of the relative merits of these two techniques. Basically, the
appeal of the Changes approach lies in its ability to mitigate concerns with
omitted variable bias when it comes to time-invariant factors difficult to measure
or quantify, but believed to have a significant effect on the dependent variable
(e.g., community or firm espirit de corps as it relates to output) . In essence,
since the Changes model involves first differencing both sides of the model,
these troublesome but constant fixed effects fall out of the equation.
Consequently, their intentional or overlooked omission from the model is a moot
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point. On the other hand, first differencing a lso removes a Jot of information
regarding actual variation in the observed variables, without a commensurate
reduction in the overall measurement error. In other words, when measurement
error is possible or likely, the Changes model will reflect a higher ratio of
measurement error to true variance, resulting in a greater bias. But, as Baltagi
{1 995) notes, an advantage of panel data is that it lessens these concerns given
the additional cross-sectional dimension for reflecting variation in variables.
Both the Levels and the Changes approaches are examined for suitability
in modeling the research propositions. Because the Levels technique is
particularly sensitive to omitted variables, and the data available may not capture
all the factors that effect local private employment, the results generated from the
Changes model are arguably more meaningful. Furthermore, as discussed

subsequently, only the Changes form of the model allows examination of
proposition {2) .

General Specification

The general form of the model is EMPJt = f(DJt. Nt. MJt. IJJ , where EMPJt is
non-farm private industry employment for county j, in time t; DJt is local defense
employment characteristics; Nt represents national level economic influences;

MJt includes migration determinants; and IJt is industry location factors. DJt is
comprised of the primary variables of interest in the study, while NJt• MJt• and IJt
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make up the control variables. Consistent with the public finance literature, DJt is
held to be exogenously determined . 2 3
Beginning with the Levels modeling a pproach, define long run equilibrium
private employment, EMPJ1* , to be a function of D and C:

(1 )

Again, DJt is the vector of characteristics related to defense installations
and their labor forces; CJt = I(Nt. MJt. IJJ .
The baseline model incorporates a dynamic specification whereby actual
regional employment, EMPJt is a function of long run equilibrium employment
EMP/ and lagged employment, EMPJ.t-l · The lagged dependent variable is
consistent with Finkel (1 995), because the present state of regional employment
is believed to be determined in part by the past state, rather than "created anew."
It also supports the desired partial adjustment setting and will provide some
gauge of regional size in the Changes model . In Levels form, the dynamic
model, then, is:

(2)

23 See discussion of military bases in an 1-0 and economic base framework, beginning on page

(continued on next page)
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Substitution of (1 ) in (2) yields:

(3)

This is the classical form of the general model to be estimated. It is
possible the disturbance may be time and/or region sensitive. Assuming the
disturbance is dependent in part on both dimensions, the three error component
(two-way) specification of the error term will accommodate this view:

Ejt

=

Ut + Vj + Wjt

(4)

Substitution of (4) into (3) yields:

EMPjt = Af3'Djt

+

A:y'Cjt + (1 - A.)EMPjt-1

+

Ut + Vj + Wjt

(5)

This is the random effects form of the general model to be estimated . The
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, as described in Kmenta (1 997), is used
to test the hypothesis H 0:

cru

2

=

2
crv

=

0, in which case the model in (5) defaults

back to the classical model in (3) as the appropriate choice of the two.
Should the null hypothesis be rejected, it is still possible that (5) is not the
appropriate specification. Specifically, it may be the case that one or more of the

33, and Mueller (1 996}.
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explanatory variables in CJt or DJt is correlated with

Ut

and/or �· For example,

\j

captures all the region related error - both true error, and error attributable to
unobserved or unmeasured region unique factors . Suppose climate - a
characteristic unique to regions, but relatively constant over time - is one of
those unmeasured factors, and population is one of the explanatory variables.
Intuitively, population is correlated with climate, but climate is omitted from the
model, so the estimates will be biased and inconsistent. A region dummy
variable can be used to capture the combined influence of cli mate and other
unobserved region specific and time-invariant characteristics . The effects of
these unobserved factors are then estimated as parameters rather than being
rolled into the error terms. A parallel solution applies to unobserved factors that
differ across time, but remain constant across regions .
Allowing for the consideration of time and region specific fixed effects, the
model in (3) can be expressed as:

(6)

Equation (6) is the fixed effects variation of the model estimated. 24 At is
used to capture unobserved/unmeasured region-invariant fixed effects, while "'PJ
captures the unobserved/unmeasured time-invariant fixed effects.

24 Equation {6) assumes both region a nd period fixed effects. It is also possible that fixed effects
prevail only across regions, or only across time, rather than both. In either case, a two error
component hybrid of equations {5) and {6) is appropriate.
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Assuming the null hypothesis for the model in (5) is rejected - ruling out
the classical model in (3) - the Hausman test, as described in Greene (2000),
facilitates testing for correlation between the explanatory variables and the error
terms. If a relationship exists, the fixed effects model described by equation (6)
is the appropriate specification. If the correlation is not significantly different from
0, the random effects model presented in (5) is appropriate.
Should the Hausman test point to the random effects model as the
•

appropriate specification, inherent difficulties with the lagged dependent variable
have to be addressed . Specifically, as illustrated in equation (5), EMPJt is a
function of VJ and EMPJ,t-1 · But this means EMPJ,t-1 is a lso a function of vJt which is
a violation of the least squares assumption that right side variables are
independent of the error term. Instrumental variable techniques are typically
necessary to preclude the biased estimates that result. For example, under the
Changes model, techniques suggested by Baltagi (1 995) and Anderson and

Hsiao (1 981 ) are applied . Specifically, (EMPJ,t-2 - EMPJ.t-3) and EMPJ ,t-2 a re
exa mined for suitability as instruments for (EMPJ,t-1 - EMPJ.t-2) .
Equations (1 ) through (6) may be converted to the Changes format simply
by taking the first differences. To illustrate, the Changes general form of the
random effects model in (5) is:

EMPJt - EMPJ.t-1

=

(7)

A.P ' (DJt - DJ.t-1) + A.y' (CJt - CJ,t-1)
+ (1 - A.) (EMPJt-1 - EMPJ,t-2) + (ut - Ut-1) + (vJ
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-

VJ) + (WJt - WJ,t-1 )

Note that the region related component of the error term, (vJ - v� , reduces
to 0, thereby dropping out of the model .

Explanatory Variables and Expected Relationships

Given DJt is the vector of observed characteristics of defense installations
and their labor forces, the variables chosen to reflect these characteristics in the
Levels form of the model are listed in Table 1 .

DEFJt is self-explanatory. As proxy for BRAC facilities reuse, LANDJt is an
approxi mation of actual installation land reuse. It is based on the total acreage
"excessed" as of November 2000, allocated across time in proportion to base
personnel losses following the corresponding BRAC round .
Referring back to equations (6) or (7), CJt is the vector of observed
characteristics which impact regional employment, other than local military
presence. More specifically, CJt = f(N., MJt• IJJ represents the underlying
economic environment in which the exogenous military shocks perform. Failure

Table

1

-

Defense Related Variables

Variable

Definition

Military and defense federal civilian employment.
Proxy for cumulative B RAC facilities reuse, measured in acres
(i.e. , LANDt + LANDt-t + LANDt-2 + . . . )
.

Notes:

1 . Measures are at the county level
2 . j denotes county j
3. t denotes year t
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to adequately consider these control factors may lead to omitted variable bias in
2
the results of the analysis. 5
Regarding the national level control variables, Nt. a number of possibilities
exist for capturing these effects. For example, Hamilton (1 983) finds compelling
evidence that crude oil price shocks are correlated with, and possibly precursors
to U . S . recessions. Specifically, for the period 1 945-1 981 , seven of the eight
post-war recessions were preceded by significant increases in the price of oil
(typically a

JA

year lag), yet the case for coincidence or a causal rmtionship

between another endogenous factor and both happenings is not evident. Hooker
and Knetter (1 997) find added support for the use of oil prices as macroeconomic
control variables. But, given the economic inertia at the national level, perhaps
the most appropriate a pproach is to control for these influences through the use
of period dummy variables (a period fixed effects specification) . It may be
difficult to argue that other proxies or combinations of measures offer a more
comprehensive representation of national factors.
The effects of crude oil prices evidenced in Hamilton's work, and that of
Keane (1 993) , suggest oil related factors may have a role elsewhere in the
model . Specifically, state-level composite energy prices, which are highly
correlated with crude oil prices, may be useful proxies of relative living and
production costs. Hence, this explanatory variable has potential in the modeling

25

As noted by Bartik (1 991 ) , the ftChanges" form of the model offers some relief to this condition.
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of both migration and industry location factors. I n either case, the expected
relationship with regional employment is negative .
The vector of control variables, CJt• is also comprised of migration
determinants, MJt· A common theme in regional studies is that employment
opportunity and amenities are significant determinants of migration. For example,
Greenwood (1 969) finds unemployment rates at the origin are a significant factor
in the decision to migrate. Schlottmann and Herzog (1 982) find the probability of
outmigration increases with the population-employment pressure index. 26 Knapp
and Graves (1 989) sketch theoretical fra meworks that have roles for location
specific amenities under both supply and demand driven migration and regional
development models. Other empirical works (e.g., Herzog and
Schlottmann, 1 986; Clark and Knapp, 1 995) further reinforce the importance of
disamenity and quality of life considerations, and employment opportunities in the
migration decision. As such, a lagged population pressure index is included . 2 7
This variable serves as a proxy for employment potential and economic
assistance. Ceteris paribus, higher ratios for past index va lues signal unfilled
demand, a ripe la bor market, and possibly the need forjobs programs and other
public assistance in the current period . The expectation is that regional
employment increases with the lagged value of the population-to-employment
ratio . At first glance, this may seem contrary to results of Schlottmann and
26

The population-employment pressure index is defined as those who can work divided by those
who do work (i.e., population 1 4 years of age or older over total employment} .
27 The population pressure index used in this study is defined as total population divided by total
employment.
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Herzog (1 982) . But the two ideas can be reconciled. Specifically, higher
population-employment pressure indices in the current period indicate either
labor force participation is low, or unemployment is high. I n the latter case, the
immediate response may be an increased propensity to migrate out, as
Schlottmann and Herzog suggest. This offers some relief to the population
pressure index via a reduction in the numerator. But, from the supply side, h igh
index values - whether due to lower participation or higher unemployment - a lso
characterize untapped labor, and may even signa l planners and government
officials that assistance is required. The resulting downstream attention acts as a
counterforce, generating jobs and increasing the denominator of the index. As
the lagged i ndex decreases in value, this effect diminishes . To assume the
opposite (i.e., that employment decreases as the lagged population pressure
index increases) might suggest depressed areas generally stagnate, and then
wither away. While there is a wealth of evidence to support the idea of regional
employment cycles, actual instances of modern ghost towns are few and far
between.
As discussed previously, Dalen berg, et. al. (1 998) find public goods
expenditures are positively related to employment. Since employment
opportunities influence the migration decision, the model incorporates a varia ble
to capture this effect. Specifically, state and local government employment is
used as a proxy for regional public goods expenditures. Intuitively, the former
should be a good substitute for the latter as the two are general ly highly
correlated .
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While most agree transfer payments offer no benefits in the form of
macroeconomic growth, some may argue the resulting increased spending has
induced employment effects at the local levels, where payments are received .
However, transfer payments are also indicative of loca l economic conditions and,
perhaps, the state of the local labor force. In this model, it is assumed the latter
negative relationship outweighs the former positive effects of i nduced
employment, such that income maintenance benefit payments are considered a
disamenity with respect to the migration decision. The model captures the effect
of this disamenity on migration, and hence employment, in the form of a lagged
per capita income ma intenance benefit payments variable.
The intangible amenities side of migration determinants may be modeled
through regional dummy variables. In modeling county level growth, Carlino and
Mills (1 987), find Census region dummies serve as good proxies for important
regional amenities. However, preliminary tests reveal group fixed effects, or
county level dummies add more power to the models that follow despite the
resulting loss in degrees of freedom. Accordingly, county level dummy variables
are examined against the random effects model form to evaluate their overall
suitability in capturing the effects of unobservable amenities.
Finally, the vector of control variables, CJt• includes industry location
factors, IJt· The literature is fairly consistent in the idea that investment in human
capital, or education, exacts a positive influence on industry location, and hence
economic growth. For example, Wasylenko and McGuire ( 1 985) find education
expenditures have a significant positive relationship with employment in the retail
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trade and finance industries, a nd overall state employment. Plaut and Pluta
(1 983) report education expenditures are a significant determinant of
manufacturing employment growth. According to Helms' 1 985 panel data study,
state revenues a pplied to public education progra ms enhance state output.
Recognizing that wages are highly correlated with education levels, a lagged
private wage rate variable is included as a proxy of regional education levels .
Per capita federal education assistance is also used to reflect improvements to
local human capital. Both capture education's role in industry location, and
hence employment growth . G iven education's potential at i mproving individual
earnings and well being, it is conceivable to think of these factors as favorable
migration determinants as well .
Keeping with conventional thought, and Blomquist's (1 988) specification of
the indirect utility function for households in his study of industry location under
cost minimization and household utility maximization criteria, household utility is
inversely related to land rents within the region. U nder monocentric models of
land rents (see Muth, 1 985), these rents can be expected to increase as one
approaches the geographic urban center, or central business district. This
stands to reason as population density increases in that direction and land
becomes scarce. In that light, population density may be viewed as a disamenity
in the migration decision . However, density is also ind icative of cultural, social,
and recreational opportunities, which are typically regarded as amenities. So,
with respect to migration determinants, the effect of population density is unclear.
But as Smith (1 9 7 1 ) notes, large cities and metropolitan areas offer well56

developed infrastructure, education institutions, services not available in smaller
places, and agglomeration economies. Accordingly, urbanization, as reflected in
population density is a favorable industry location factor. I n this model, it is
treated as such and this positive effect is assumed to outweigh the negative
consequences of higher rents and congestion. The lagged value of population
per acre is the specific variable used. Its expected positive relationship with
employment is congruent with the results of Herzog's and Schlottmann's 1 993
study which finds that for most metropolitan areas (i.e., those below 4.4 million in
population), population functions as a net-amenity.
Regarding industry structure, exa mination of Figure 4 reveals a consistent
trend in the manufacturing and service industry sectors during the sample period.
Specifically, as a percentage of total U .S . employment, manufacturing has
sharply declined over these twenty years while the service industry has boomed .
As such, the set of industry location control variables includes variables that
capitalize on this obvious structural shift. In the spirit of shift-share analysis,
regional employment growth related to the industry mix effect is captured through
variables that reflect the region's industry structure for the preceding period .
Variables depicting relative industry representation (e.g., EMPuiEMPJ) are wel l
suited for this role. Of course, for the n industries comprising the structure being
modeled, only n-1 such variables ca n be used or they will all sum to one,
resulting in collinear regressors.
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U.S. Industry Employment Composition
1 977-1 997
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Industry Employment Composition

The nominal levels of industry employment illustrated in Figure 5 provide
some insight into the appropriate choice for the industry structure variables.
Though manufacturing has radically dropped as a percent of U . S. employment,
growth-wise it has only declined 3 . 5 percent during this same period . On the
other hand, services has grown 1 20 percent while the remaining non-farm private
sectors have more or less moved together, growing 53 percent when viewed in
aggregate. Therefore, lagged values of percent services and percent other
private employment (i.e., aggregate non-farm private employment other than

services and manufacturing) are included to modeling regional industry structure
effects.
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Industry Employment Levels

Economic base theory suggests resilience to exogenous regional shocks
may be determined in part by the community's degree of industry specialization.
Specifically, the more specialized a county becomes, the more likely it is
producing for demands beyond its own internal consumption . As this ratio of
basic to nonbasic industry grows, the effects of exogenous shocks such as local
military draw downs and base closures are Jess pronounced. For example,
defense workers stationed in a county that is highly specialized in agriculture
may have to satisfy a greater portion of their consumer demands through imports
(e.g., catalogs, mail order, shopping excursions, etc.). When these workers
depart, the loss of this consumption has little or no effect on the host community.
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Of course this dampening effect applies in the case of defense buildups as well.
To model this effect, a lagged coefficient of specialization variable is interacted
with the defense personnel variables in an appended variation of the Changes
model. The expectation is that increased specialization reduces the effect of the
primary defense variables. The coefficient of specialization is a lso included as a
stand-alone variable to preclude erroneous acceptance of the interaction term as
significant if the specialization coefficient alone is in fact carrying the explanatory
weight. The Levels model does not include a coefficient of specialization

interaction term, as this term cannot be litera lly transformed to a Changes form
with any economic meaning. It does, however, contain a stand-alone industry
specialization variable, because even by itself it is expected to have a role in
determining regional employment growth. Specifically, the coefficient of
specialization is expected to have a negative relationship with employment; as
industry composition becomes more specialized, employment growth is retarded .
The thought here is that much like a stock portfolio, over time the diverse
regional structures are subject to less industry specific risk, and therefore rea lize
more sta ble growth patterns. 28
Finally, IJt would not be complete without consideration of the exogenously
determined factor, farm employment. Like defense, the bulk of demand for this
industry's output originates from beyond county lines. Though the purpose of
this study is to examine defense employment effects on local communities,

28

Much work has been done in this area. For instance, see Kurre and Woodruff III (1 995).
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failure to consider farm employment would proba bly result in omitted variable
bias; particularly since positive indirect and induced employment relationships
are expected between farm employment and private employment. The specific
variables incorporated in the CJt vector of control variables for the Levels model
are summarized in Table 2 .
Algebraically, the preliminary specification of the model in Levels, random
effects form is reflected in equation (8) . Expected signs are given .
EMPJt

= a

+

A�1DEFJt
+ A�zLANDJt
+ A'Y1STNRGYJ.t-1
+ A)'zPPIJ,t- 1
+ A'YJSLGJt
+ AY.4PCIMBPJ ,t-1
+ AYsPWRJ,t-1
+ AysPCFEAJ.t- 1
+ A'YTDNSITYJ ,t-1
+ A'YaPSRVCJ,t-1
+ AygPOPEJ,t-1
+ AY1 0CSJ.t-1
+ AyuFARMJt
+ (1-A)EMPJ.t-1
+ Ut + Vj + Wjt

A� 1 > 0
A�2 > 0
A'Y1 < 0
A'Y2 > 0
A'Y3 > 0
A'Y4 < 0
A'Ys > 0
A'Y6 > 0
A'Y7 > 0
A'Ys > 0
A'Y9 > 0
A'Y10 < 0
A'Yu > 0
( 1-A) > 0

(8)

N ote that this initial specification facilitates testing of propositions (1 ) and
(3) . Specifically, proposition (3) holds that military base reutilization efforts create
local employment. Since LAND is the proxy for cumulative facilities reuse under
BRAC, this is modeled in the expectation that aEMP/aLAND = A�z > 0. The
expectation that aEMP/aDEF = A�1 > 0, a ppears to say defense workforce levels
exhibit a positive relationship with local employment. Congruent with
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Table

2

-

Levels Model Control Variables
Definition

Variable

STNRGYJ.t-1 State level composite cost of energy ($/million BTU); proxy for
relative cost of living/cost of production; lagged one period .
PPIJ,t-1

Population Pressure Index (population/non-farm private
employment); lagged one period.

SLGJt

State and Local Government employment in year t .

PCIMBPJ.t- 1

Per Capita Income Maintenance Benefit Payments; lagged one
period .

PW� .t-1

Private Wage Rate (private industry earnings/private industry
employment) ; ($000); proxy for workforce skills/education level;
lagged one period.

PCFEAJ.t-1

Per Capita Federal Education Assistance ($000) ; lagged one
period.

DNSITYJ.t-1

Population density (population/acres); lagged one period .

PSRVCJ .t-1

Percent services industry employment (service SIC
employment/employment for private, non-farm SICs) ; lagged one
period .

POPEJ .t-1

Percent other private industry employment (employment for
private, non-farm industry SICs excluding services and
manufacturing/employment for private, non-farm SICs); lagged
one period.

CSJ .t-1

Coefficient of Industry Specialization, lagged one period:
n
EMP\J .t-1
- ""'

(1

2 £..J
1=1

FARMJt
Notes:

EMPJ ,t-1

EMPIUS
,H
us
EMPH

)
'

0 -< CS�.t-1 -< 1

Employment for farming SIC in year t.
1 . Measures are at the county level unless otherwise stated
2. i denotes industry i
3. j denotes county j
4. t denotes year t
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conventional wisdom regarding employment multipliers, this a nticipated outcome
supports proposition (1 ); the idea that increases i n base labor spur positive
indirect employment effects. However, in consideration of proposition (2), which
states decreases in base employment generally exert a positive indirect effect as
well, the anticipated direction of A.�, really says the positive effects of defense
labor increases outweigh the asymmetrical, or negative effects of defense labor
decreases. Because the Levels model form does not permit decomposition of
these countervailing effects, DEF is expected to test insignificant in one or more
of the Levels model variations. But the Levels model represents only a baseline.
Its conversion to a Changes form presents modeling solutions to this concern
and the issue of instrumental variable selection for the lagged dependent
variable, private employment (EMPJ.t-t ) . The Changes form is used to examine
propositions (4) a nd (5) .

Data Collection and Adjustments

The observations for this study are compiled from a variety of sources into
one panel data set spanning 20 years (1 978-1 997) and 3,092 counties. Virtually
every U . S. county for the 50 United States, plus Washington DC, is included in
the set. The only regions excluded are portions of Alaska that account for 20%
of its population. N umerous bou ndary redefin itions for these areas between
1 97 8 and 1 997 rendered related data unusable. The data set i ncludes 61 ,840
records.
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Employment and Income

Industry level employment and income figures (excluding military and
defense civilians), as well as overall population values are from the B EA's 1 9691 998 Regional Economic Information System (REI S) CD ROM disk. R E I S
employment figures estimates are largely by place of work. Income figures are
place of residence and adjusted via the GOP deflator to 1 998 dollars.

Military and Defense Civilian Personnel

The R E IS database cannot be used to obtain the necessary defense
personnel figures for a number of reasons. First, defense civilians are not
reported as such; they are rolled up into the overall federal civilian category.
Second, the REIS military figures reflect both full-time active duty members, and
part-time guard and reserve personnel. Because guard and reserve personnel
generally work in that capacity only one weekend per month, and two weeks per
year, place of work and place of residence often do not coincide for these
members. As such, that portion of the military employment figure reflects
aggregate data apportioned to the county level based on population . This
creates a significant complication in the data since the guard and reserve
represent 39 percent of the uniformed service members {1 999 figures) . Finally,
examination of base reutilization impacts requires installation level figures so
defense personnel in a given county can be identified to either ongoing
operations, or discontinued operations, whichever the case may be. As it is, a
number of counties host both types of installations. Since the lowest level of
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aggregation for REIS data is county level, it is not possible to make this
distinction using those figures. Consequently, military and defense civilian
personnel figures for 1 977-1 999 are from the DoD Distribution of Personnel by
State and by Selected Locations published annually by the Directorate for

Information Operations and Reports, Washington Headquarters Services, Office
of the Secretary of Defense .
The DoD Distribution of Personnel figures are reported at the installation
level, or by city in cases where personnel are stationed at a unit geographically
separated from a base (e.g., ROTC staffs, Defense Plant Representative Offices,
recruiters, etc) . After making adjustments for known name changes, the number
of stateside locations hosting defense personnel at any point over the 23 years
sampled total 963. The majority of these figures were compiled manually as they
were not available in electronic form . Column-footing and cross-footing were

·

used to ensure accuracy of data transcription. Though data for additional years
is available, manual transfer was deemed too time intensive given the reporting
convention used prior to 1 977. In either case, the selected interval allows for 1 0
years of data prior to the first B RAC, and 1 0 years subsequent to that round.
The military and defense civilian personnel figures are reported as of fiscal
year end (September 30, 1 9XX) . However, REIS figures are essentially
weighted average levels across the calendar year. Therefore, the DoD figures
are adjusted to coincide with the REIS data . Specifically, calendar year weighted
averages were derived using the following formula: CYWAX2
30SEPX1

+

(22/32) x 30SEPX2

+

=

(9/32) x

(1 /32) x 30SE PX3, where CYWAX2 is
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calendar year weighted average employment for year X2, and 30S E PXX is the
reported defense employment level as of September 30th 1 9XX. 29 This results in
the loss of two years of military personnel data : 1 977 and 1 999. The latter year
is not a "real" loss since corresponding REIS data only covers employment,
income, and military retiree data through 1 99 7 .
The use o f detailed installation personnel data for all stateside military
sites addresses three limitations of earlier BRAC impact studies: (1 ) it facilitates a
comprehensive review covering all 50 states; (2) it factors in defense personnel
dynamics of non-BRAC sites which share a county with a B RAC installation; and
(3) it explicitly considers the time dimension for personnel flows out of the base,
rather than assuming draw downs occurred en masse. Addressing the first
limitation helps to paint a whole picture and ensure robust results. However,
addressing the latter two limitations is of greatest concern . Failure to consider
net growth (net losses) for non-B RAC sites within BRAC counties will bias the
multiplier estimates downward (upward). The potential for such bias is great
given the 88 counties that were home to 97 major BRAC sites, were also home

29 This approach assumes personnel increases/decreases occur on a straight-line basis from one

measurement date to the next. Specifically, from SEPX1 to SEPX2, the average monthly change
is (SEPX2-SEPX1 )/1 2. Similarly, from SEPX2 to SEPX3 the average monthly change is (SE PX3SEPX2)/1 2. On a straight-line basis, the level at JANX2 is then S E PX1 + 3[(SEPX2-SEPX1 )/1 2],
or SEPX1 + (3/1 2)(SEPX2-SEPX1). For JANX3 it is SEPX2 + (3/1 2)(S EPX3-SEPX2). From
JANX2 to SEPX2 the monthly change is constant at (SEPX2-SEPX1 )/1 2, and from SEPX2 to
JANX3 it is constant at (SEPX3-SEPX2)/1 2. Therefore, the weighted average personnel levels
for calendar year 1 9X2 can be arrived at through the following formula: (9/1 2)[(JANX2 +
SEPX2)/2] + (3/1 2)[(SEPX2 + JANX3)/2) (9/24) (JANX2 + SEPX2) + (3/24)(SEPX2 + JANX3) .
Substitution for JANX2 and JANX3 yields (9/24)[SEPX1 + (3/1 2)(SEPX2-SEPX1 ) + SEPX2] +
(3/24)[SEPX2 + SEPX2 + 3/1 2(SEPX3-SEPX2)] (9/24)(9/1 2SEPX1 +(1 5/1 2)SEPX2) +
(3/24)[(21/1 2)SEPX2 + (3/1 2)SEPX3) = (81/288)SEPX1 + (1 35/288)SEPX2 + (63/288)SEPX2 +
(9/288)SEPX3 (9132)SEPX1 + (22132)SEPX2 + (1132)SEPX3.
=

=

=

66

to 1 95 other military facilities, which continued operations. The time dimension of
personnel flows is important because under BRAC guidelines, the services are
given up to six years to close a base. As such, the actual closure execution
interval can vary from base to base. In fact, for B RAC '88 and BRAC '91 , closure
intervals averaged just under 5-

Y2

years , and just over 3 years, respectively

(GAO, 1 998) . 30 If personnel reductions are assumed to occur en masse on the
official closure date when in fact they were evenly spread or loaded toward the
front of the 6-year window (as is likely the case since the delays on most
closures related to cleanup and reutilization preparation, rather than personnel
adjustments) , multiplier estimates may very well be biased downward.
To give an idea of the magnitude and scope of stateside defense
presence, the geographic distribution of defense personnel in 1 977 (the
beginning of the data collection period) is presented in Figure 6 . The areas
experiencing the greatest losses of defense personnel across the subsequent 20
years are illustrated in Figure 7 .

Base Realignment and Closure Classification

Sources for B RAC data (i.e., bases selected for closure or reduction, and
the year chosen) are the O EA webpage, the March 31 , 1 999 OEA Base
Reutilization Status Report, and the 1 996 CRS report, Military Base Closures
Since 7 988: Status and Employment Changes at the Community and State

30 Averages for the last two BRACs ('93 and '95) were not available in GAO's 1 998 report since at
the time of publication six years had not yet lapsed under either closure round.
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Level. From this list of B RAC sites, bases are classified as major B RAC

installations if the facility employed at least 300 military and defense civilians in
1 987 or thereafter. This criteria closely parallels the U . S.C. Title 1 0 requirement
for Congressional approval of restructuring actions that impact more than 1 ,000
or half the resident federal workers at bases of 300 or more employees. A total

of 97 installations are identified and classified as major B RAC facilities (see
Appendix C) . The corresponding labor force is identified as B RAC related via a
dummy variable, which takes the value of one beginning with the first post
selection year these employment levels peaked. In most cases the "peak" was
the year of selection. In some instances, post-B RAC base employment levels
did not "peak" until 1 -3 years after the base's selection. Because these B RAC
military and civilian levels represent public infrastructure capacity that may come
ava ilable for private reutilization, it only makes sense to identify the workforce as
such once the base begins its draw down, and thereafter. Initially, the distinction
of B RAC related personnel reductions is used to apportion installation acreage
reuse figures across the periods land transfers most likely occurred . 31 This
distinction is also beneficial later when the defense employment change variable
is decomposed into its positive and negative components.
After making the "B RAC" vs. "ongoing" distinction for defense personnel
data, the figures a re aggregated at the county level. A tota l of 499 counties
played host to the 963 military facilities noted above - an average of nearly two
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installations per military county. Of these 499 counties, four are dropped as part
of the Alaskan areas for which consistent REIS data is not available over the
sample period. Composed mostly of remote early ballistic missile warning and
air defense activities, the military presence associated with these four counties is
relatively minor and does not include any of the major BRAC installations.

Military Counties

The corresponding counties for each of the 962 military locations are
determined primarily through CD Light's ZI Piist5™ database on the l nternet. 32 In
many cases the station name is too narrow for this database, so an intermediate
step of obtaining applicable Z I P codes through the U S Postal Service is used . In
some instances, Internet search sites, mapping software, and a Rand McNal ly
Road Atlas are employed extensively to pinpoint the exact geographical location
of the insta llation .

Base Facilities Reutilization

Variables representing facilities reutilization under B RAC are derived from
personnel flows and base acreage data . Specifically, values of cumulative land
areas declared excess by base, through November 2000, are from the O EA.
These figures are spread over time in proportion to personnel outflow patterns at

31 Detail regarding the periods in which actual land transfer transactions occurred was not
available, so it was necessary to develop a rational means for apportioning cumulative figures
across time.
32 www.zipinfo.com
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the respective B RAC sites. Apportionment starts with the first year following
BRAC selection in which base personnel levels were at their peak. While these
are not precise measures, the combination of personnel flows and excessed
acreage data should be fairly representative of the actual resources made
available or anticipated to be available for private reuse.

Oil and Energy Prices

Oil and energy price data are from the Energy I nformation Administration
(E tA), U .S. Department of Energy. The energy figures (dollars per million BTU's)
are state-level values from the source data for the 1 997 EIA State Energy Price
and Expenditure Report (S EPER) . For consistency with income figures in the
data set, these values are adjusted to 1 998 dollars via the G D P deflator.
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Chapter IV
F I N DINGS

Random vs. Fixed Effects in the Levels Model

The analysis begins with a comparison of the Levels model in equation (8)
in its random effects and fixed effects forms (see page 61 ) . Recall the only
adjustment required to express (8) in the period and group fixed effects form is
the addition of year and county dummy vectors, At and 'PJ, and replacement of
Ut + VJ + WJt with the completely random error term, ejt· The relevant results are
summarized in Table 3 and Table 4 .
Keeping with Kmenta (1 997), the LaGrange multiplier statistic i s used to
test if the random effects model is more appropriate than the O LS form.
Specifically, the hypothesis is:

Ho:

<Tu

2

H A : Ho

=

2

<Tv

=

0

is not true
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Table

3

-

Levels Model

Results, OLS and Random Effects

Dependent Variable: EMP1,

Random Effects 0 & t)

OLS
Coeff

T-Stat

DEF1,

0.10

25.00

LAND1,

0.79

1 1 .29

8 . 62

STNRGYt.t- 1

33.96

2.41

SL G1,

-0.02

-6. 1 6

PCIMBPt.t-t

- 1 .15

- 1 1 .82

PWRt.t-1

32.40

8.63

PCFEA1.t- �

-0.09

-0.21

DNSITYt .t- �

-0.20

-23.37

1 734.76

8 . 20

466.03

3. 1 6

-1 201 .71

-6 .59

FARM1,

0.27

20.65

EMPt.t-1

1 .02

POPE1,t-1
CSt.t-t

F(o.o5.

281 6.78

z

=

F -Stat

=

5,703,579

58733)

=

1 .70

R
14,

••

1 .04

PPI1.t-t

PSRVC1 .1-1

••

•
••
••
••

••

=

T-Stat

0. 1 2

1 7. 1 0

0.64

9.09

62 . 1 9

3.52

4.01

0.20

0.00

0.1 6

-0.93

-5.98

••

••
••

1 .98 .
-1 2.06

2 .48 .
-4.49

0.29

1 3.46

1 .01
z

=

=

1 723.69

t

1 9)

t GLS estimation used in the random effects model does not produce a precise
2
counterpart to R •

•
•

•

Significant at the 95 percent level.
Significant at the 99 percent level.
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••

•
3.67 •

- 1 279.87

R

3092; years, T

••

2 . 02 .

552.49

••

••
••

1 . 31
1 1 77 . 7 7

••

••

1 2 .30
-0 . 1 8

0.999

(counties, n

Coeff

••
••
••

Table

4 - Levels Model

Results, Fixed Effects

Dependent Variable: EMPJt

Region Fixed Effects 0)
Coeff

Coeff

NA

At

DEFtr
LANDJt
STNRGYJ,t-1

-2.08

0.10

25.18

-0.06

-1 .90

0.94

1 1 .97

••

0.76

1 0.99

••

0.91

1 1 .64

-7.34

••

94 . 1 4

7.64

••

4.65

0.14

4.40

••

33.36

2.38 .

76.51

2.23

-7.54

••

-0. 1 0

-6.97

-82.79

SLGtr

-0. 1 1

•

PCIMBP1.r-1

-0.50

-2 . 05

PWR:!.r-1

73.21

1 1 .27

••

2.92

••

0.69

2 .74

••

229 1 .29

4.19

••
•

3 .24

DNS11Yt.t-1

not shown

-0.07

1 47.28

PSRVCt.t-1

not shown

not shown
•

T- Stat

••

PPIJ,t-1

PCFE�.t-1

Coeff

T-Stat

NA

not shown

�I

2-Way Fixed Effects 0 & t)

Period Fixed Effects (t)

T-Stat

POPF;,t-1

1 032.67

2.43

c�.t-1

-623.61

-1 .05

-0.02

-6.35

••
••

-1 .28

-1 2.69

25.22

5.62

0.41

0.93

••

-1 . 7 7
8 .99

••

5 .98

5 . 36

••

••

0.57
2 1 04.44

2 .29 .

-0.20

-23 .55

1 35 1 .4 1

6.1 1

••

629.95

4.25

••

649.26

1 . 54

-1 1 43.25

-6.29

••

-779.59

-1 . 3 1

3 . 70

0.22

3 .04

••

0.26

20.41

••

0.09

1 .29

0.97

654.65

••

1 .02

2840.64 ••

0 .97

658.04

2
R =

0.999

2
R

=

0.999

2
R =

30,61 5

F-Stat

=

2,539,500

1 .30

F(O.o5. 32, 58715) =

(counties, n
•
••

=

1 .45

3092; years, T

Significant at the 95 percent level.
Significant at the 99 percent level.
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=

19)

F-Stat

F(o o5 3124. 55623)
.

,

••

-0.52

EMP1.t-�

F(o.o5. 3105. 55642) =

•

86.47

FARMtt

F-Stat =

••

=
=

0.999
31 ,001
1 . 30

••

••

The test yields a statistic that far exceeds the critical value of c2 , so the
resulting conclusion is to accept the alternative hypothesis, HA. 33 Therefore, the
classica l OLS model is not the appropriate choice for the data .
N ext, the H ausman test is used to evaluate the three error component (2way) random effects form against the combined period and group fixed effects
model in Table 4. The test statistic, W , is based on the Wald criterion. 34 Once
again, the computed value far exceeds the critical value of c2 . 35 It follows that
the additional period and group error components of the random effects model
are not orthogona l . As a result, estimates under the random effects specification
will not be consistent, so the fixed effect model becomes the appropriate choice
of the two.
The Hausman test is also performed on both 1 -way random effects model
variations (i.e., period-only and region-only) . . In both cases, the same outcome is
realized : the fixed effects forms are superior. 36 This comes as no surprise particularly with respect to the region fixed effects model since the analysis is
comprehensive rather than a random sampling of U .S. counties. Both Greene
(2000) and Kmenta (1 997) hint at this eventua lity. With those two references and

33 For the random effects model in Table 3, LM 31 ,495. The 99.5 percent critical value of c2
with two degrees of freedom, c22 = 1 0.66.
.
34 Reference Greene (2000}.
35 For the 2-way random effects and fixed effects models, the value of W 2,809. With 1 4
=

=

degrees of freedom, the 99.5 percent critical value of d i s 31 .

36 The W-statistic has a value of 2,875 for the region random effects vs. region fixed effects
models, and a value of 40 for the period random effects vs. period fixed effects models. At the
99.5% level, the critical value of c142

=

31 .
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the test results above in mind, random effects (error components) specification
forms are excluded from further consideration in this study.
It is worth noting the choice of fixed effects models can be examined in
another light. Specifically, as demonstrated by Greene (2000) , F statistics can
be used to test the joint significance of period fixed effects and region fixed
effects. 37 In the case of period fixed effects, the F test results point to this model
form over OLS . 38 Further testing yields results that support the region fixed
effects model over simple OLS . J9 F inally, in the presence of region fixed effects,
the F test results suggest the combined period and region fixed effects model is
the better choice. 40

This choice comes at a considerable loss in terms of

degrees of freedom (i .e., one region dummy variable for each of 3,092 counties),
but the sheer size of the data set more than accommodates.
A few additional observations can be made from results in Ta ble 3 and
Table 4. First, the large F-statistics suggest the models as a whole are
significant. The explanatory power of all five models is also very high (R2

>

0.99). Of course, this is to be expected with a lagged dependent variable on the
37 For period fixed effects vs. OLS, the statistic is: [(R2u - R2r)l{n- 1)]/[{1-R2u)/{nT - n - K)] . The
region fixed effects vs. OLS, the statistic is: [(R2u - R2r}l(f-l)]/[{1-R2u)/{nT - T - K)] . For two-way
vs. region-only fixed effects, the statistic is [(R2u - R2r)/(f- 1)]/{(1-R2u)/[{n- l) (f-1) - K)] } .
38 From Table 3, R2 for the OLS form, R2r = 0.99927 . R2 for the unrestricted period fixed effects
model, R2u, is 0.99928 {reference the second model in Table 4). For the period-only fixed effects
model, F-Stat 58.90, and at the 95 percent level, F<18, 5871 4J "" 1 .6 1 . This outcome favors the
�eriod effects model over simple OLS.
9 From Table 3, R2 for the OLS form, R2r = 0.99927. R2 for the unrestricted region fixed effects
model, R2u, is 0.99942 {reference the first model in Table 4). For the region-only fixed effects
model, F -Stat 4 . 62 The critical value of F at the 95 percent level is F <3091• 55,641J "" 1 .30. This
result supports a region fixed effects model over simple OLS.
40 In this case, the restricted model is the region-on!� fixed effects one, while the unrestricted
model is the region and period fixed effects form. R r 0.99942 and R2 u = 0.99943. The result is
=

=

.

=
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(continued on next page)

right-hand side. Focusing only on the 2-way fixed effects model, all of the control
variables except state and local government employment (SLGJJ, and lagged
state-level energy cost (STNRGYJ, t-1 ) have the expected signs. However, the
latter, along with PCIMBPJ ,t-lr POPEJ,t-1 • CSJ,t-1 • FARMJt are not significant. For the
remaining four models, all but one or two of the variables are significant and most
of the signs are as expected . It should also be noted that where a pplicable, the
period and region dummy variables in these fixed effects models and all the ones
that follow generally are significant, though the coefficients and T-statistics are
not reported to save space.
Between the five models of Table 3 and Table 4, SLGJt and STNRGYj .t.1
are least consistent with expectations. I n-depth comments a bout this outcome
are deferred because these results represent only a rudimentary first look at
modeling form. Suffice it to say the addition of Change variables that cannot be
literally adapted from the Levels form, along with the results of the forthcoming
Changes models, suggest these estimates probably suffer from modeling form

error and omitted variable bias.
All of the Levels model specifications imply the relationship between
defense employment and local private employment must be either positive or
negative; none of them a llow examination of both possibilities (i .e., asymmetrical
relationships) . That said, of the two defense employment impact propositions,
only the first (Proposition 1 ) can be examined . The OLS, random effects, and
that F-Stat

=

59.22. At the 95 percent level, F<,a. 55623) "" 1 .61 , so the two-way fixed effects model

(continued on next page)
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period-only fixed effects results support Proposition (1 ) since the signs of the
defense employment variable, DEFJt. are positive and significant in these three
models. Assuming asymmetrical employment effects exist, the net positive signs
of the defense variables in these Levels models imply the positive effect of base
employment increases overwhelm the inverse relationship of base employment
decreases. If one expects the effect of job creation through build up to be more
pronounced than that of job creation through destruction, this stands to reason.
However, the overall negative (and significant) DEFJt coefficient in the region-only
fixed effects model suggests just the opposite. Clearly, the decomposition of
positive and negative defense personnel movements under the Changes model
will shed light in this area .
Finally, the signs and significance of the installation reuti lization proxy,
LANDJtt lend support for Proposition (3) . Specifically, in the two models on Table
3 a nd the three on Table 4, the coefficients for LANDJt suggest that as base land
and infrastructure is released to the community, local employment increases by a
factor of between 0.64 and 0.94 jobs per acre.
None of the Levels models address concerns over the lagged dependent
variable's independence with respect to the error term. This oversight is by
design because the next step in the process is to examine the Changes model,
which offers a solution to this issue. Furthermore, by its very nature of first
differencing, the Changes model eliminates concerns with region related random

is superior.
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or fixed effects, as the corresponding random error components or fixed dummy
variables cancel out. With respect to the 2-way fixed effects Levels model, this
translates to the recovery of the large loss in degrees of freedom discussed
earlier. If an interim conclusion can be made, it's that the random effects model
forms can be abandoned in the remaining analysis based on the desire to
capture macroeconomic influences via period dummy control variables a nd the
test results thus far. This decision is congruent with a priori reasoning regarding
the sample type. Specifically, Greene (2000) suggests the region fixed effects
form is reasonable where 1 00% population sampling of the cross-sectional data
is involved and differences between the regions " . . . can be viewed as parametric
shifts of the regression function."

Baltagi (1 995) reinforces this notion, noting

the fixed effects form is appropriate when inferences about the results are not
intended to extend beyond the sample. For all practical purposes, this study and
the data fulfill these criteria .

Literal Transformation of the Levels Model to a Changes Form

Notwithstanding the results of the Levels models above, the desire to
decompose defense employment impacts into their positive and negative
elements points to the Changes variation of the model in equation (8) as the
stronger contender. The first difference specification form a lso helps in
addressing concerns with instrumental variable selection for the lagged
dependent variable.
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First d ifferencing simply involves subtracting the previous period's value
for a given variable, from the current period's value. For exa mple, the dependent
variable in the Changes model is defined as:

EMPCHGJt = EMPJt - EMPJ,t-1

(9)

Equation (1 O) reflects the literal Changes form for the 2-way fixed effects
Levels version of the model in equation (8) . Definitions for the right-hand side

variables in {1 0) are provided in Table 5 .

EMPCHGJt = At - At-1
+ 'Pj - 'Pj (= 0)
+ A.� 1 DEFCHGJt
+ A.�2LANDCHGJt
+ A.y1 STNRGYCHJ.1-1
+ A.y2PPICHGJ.t-1
+ A.YJSLGCHGJt
+ A.y4PCIMBPCHJ ,t-1
+ A.ysPWRCHGJ,t-1
+ A.ysPCFEACHGJ,t-1
+ A.17DNSITYCHJ,t-1
+ A.ysPSRVCCHGJ,t-1
+ A."(gPOPECHGJ.t- 1
+ A.y10CSCHGJ.t-1
+ A.yuFARMCHGJt
+ ( 1 -A.)EMPCHGJ.t- 1
+ eJt

{10)
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
>0
>0
>0
AYIO < 0
A'Yn > 0
( 1 -A.) > 0

A-� 1
A-�2
A.y1
A.y2
A.y3
A.y4
A.ys
A.y6
A.y1
A.ys
"Ay9

With regard to the period dummy variables, the Changes model a bove
presents some difficulties. Specifically, first differencing these dummies yields
80

Table

5

-

I nitial

Changes Model Variables

Variable

Defin ition

DEFCHG11

Change in military and defense federal civilian employment, from year t1 to year t.

LANDCHG11

Proxy for BRAC facilities converted to reuse (acres) in year t. This
figure is based on the actual area of land declared excess for non
defense reutilization, spread over time in proportion to the draw down of
personnel at the respective BRAC sites.

STNRGYCHJ.t-1

State level change in the composite cost of energy, from t-2 to t-1 .

PPICHGJ,t-1

Change in Population Pressure Index, from t-2 to t- 1 .

SLGCHG1,

State and Local Government employment, from t-1 to t.

PCIMBPCHJ.t-1

Change in Per Capita I ncome Maintenance Benefit Payments, from t-2
to t-1 .

PWRCHG1.1•1

Change in Private Wage Rate, from t-2 to t-1 .

PCFEACHGJ.t-t

Change in Per Capita Federal Education Assistance, from t-2 to t- 1 .

DNSITYCHJ.t-1

Change in population density, from t-2 to t-1 .

PSRVCCHGJ.t-1

Change in percent service industry employment, from t-2 to t-1 .

POPECHGJ,t-l

Change in percent other private industry employment, from t-2 to t-1 .

CSCHGJ.t-1

Change in the Coefficient of Industry Specialization; interaction variable
for use with defense variables in the Changes model (see
Coefficient of Industry Specialization computation) .

Table 2 for

FARMCHG1,

Change in farming employment, from t-1 to t.

EMPCHGJ.t-1

Lagged dependent variable (i.e . , change i n non-farm private
employment, from t-2 to t-1).

Notes:

1 . Measures are at the county level unless otherwise stated
2. i denotes industry i
3 . j denotes county j
4. t denotes year t
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values of 1 if At
1 (At - At-1

=

=

0-1

1 (At - At-1
=

=

1

-

0

=

1 ), but it a lso yields values of -1 when At-1

=

-1 ) . Intuitively, this l iteral transformation has no meaningful

economic interpretation. However, recognizing the intent is to control for
macroeconomic influences in a given year, or changes in these factors from one
year to the next, use of period dummies (At ) in the Changes model, rather than
differences in these dummies (At - At_1 ) more appropriately addresses concerns
with national level control variables. The first attempt at a Changes form of the
Levels model is adjusted accordingly.

This adjustment is the only deviation from

the literal transformation of the Levels models already considered . The
coefficient estimates for the transformed models are presented in Table 6.
Results for the classical form appear first. The period-only fixed effects
model is again evaluated against the OLS model through the F test. As with the
Levels period-only fixed effects model, the F statistic exceeds the critica l value,

so the period fixed effects form of the Changes model is superior to simple
OLS. 4 1 Region-only and two-way (period and region) fixed effects models are
excluded from the literal Changes analysis. As discussed earlier and noted in
equation (1 0), this is because under first differencing, time invariant region fixed
effects, '¥J, drop out.
When running the models in Table 6, the routine statistical output provides
a Durbin-Watson value of 1 .877, which, being close to 2, hints at rejecting the
possibility of autocorrelation . But, as Gujarati (1 995) notes, in a utoregressive
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Table 6 - Literal Transformation of

Levels Model to Changes Form

Dependent Variable: EMPCHGu

Period Fixed Effects (t)

OLS

Coeff
NA

1u

-0.22

DEFCHG1t

2.37

LANDCHG1t
STNRGYCHt.t-1

-242.1 2

Period Fixed Effects (t)

T-Stat

Coeff

••
-4 . 1 9
1 1 .83 ••

429.28

SLGCHG1t

1 .06

34.36 ••

PCIMBPCH1.t-1

1 . 23

2.58 .

1 5 1 .35

PWRCHG1.t-1
PCFEACHGt.t·1

3.78

DNSITYCHt.t-1

951 3.47

PSRVCCHG1.t-1

2693.29

POPECHGt.t-1

1 91 1 .04
-3665.65

CSCHG1.t-1
FARMCHG11

1.13

EMPCHGt.t-1

639.75

Final est. of Rho

not shown
2.31
346.72
1 .08

9.40 • •
3.06 ••

-

1 424.76

3.24 ••
4.25 ••

F-Stat =

F (0.05. 14. 58733! =

1 .85

-4749.1 7

1 0.60 ••
203.87 ••

1 .1 3
641 .37

1 0.34 ••
205.48 • •

4,743
1 .70

2
R =

0.540

F-Stat =

2,1 53

F(o.05. 32. 58715) =

(counties, n

=

9382.48
1 41 4.40
1 821 . 1 4
-4934.25
1 .1 3
61 2.99
0.08

NA
0.531

3.58

2.99 ••
-5.53 • •

1 758.00

1 .1 6
1 74.34

1 5 . 1 3 ••

9030.98

368.42
-0.67

1 0.33 ••
2.88 ••

3.63

NA
2
R =

- 1 .22

1 7 3.49

1 5 .80 ••
3.51 ••

2 . 30
-75.75

35.25 ••

-0.67

Coeff

-0.21

-2.24 •
6.75 ••

-91 .57

(Autocorr. Corrected)

not shown

-4.07 • •
1 1 .64 ••

-0.21

- 1 5.96 ••
8.39 ••

PPICHGt.t-1

T-Stat

1 .45

3092; years, T

=

T-Stat

-4.03 ••
1 1 . 1 8 ••
- 1 .86

7 . 1 6 ••
37 . 32 ••
-1 .21

•
1 0.39 •
2.90 ••
1 5 . 1 9 ••
1 .85

3.1 2 ••
••
-5.78
1 0. 39 ••

1 91 .04 ••
20.64 ••

2
R =

t
t
F (0.05, 32. s8715l = t
F -Stat =

1 9)

t Results are based on transformed data (i.e y•j1 = (1 - p 2) 1 1�11: y*Jt - PYJ.t-1 • for t = 2 to T; and similarly for
x *JJ, so these statistics are not meaningful.

.•

• Significant at the 95 percent level.
•• Significant at the 99 percent level.

41

In this case, R2u =0.54; R2, = 0.53; n 3,092; T = 1 9; K
66.09. At the 95 percent level, F(1 B, ssJ 1 41 "" 1 .61 .
=
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=

1 5. The computed F statistic, F-Stat

=

models like this partial adjustment one, there is an integra l bias toward
overlooking serial correlation in the D-W statistic. Durbin's M test is suggested
as an a lternative. 42 Test results indicate the null hypothesis of zero
autocorrelation cannot be rejected . 43 However, as suggested in Kmenta (1 997),
wrongly assuming the disturbances are independent is much more damaging
than allowing for autoregression that may not be present. I n that light, the third
model in Table 6, and all remaining models in this study are corrected for first
order autocorrelation via the Prais-Winsten iterative method. U nder this
transformation technique, as outlined in Kmenta (1 997), none of the observations
are lost. The first estimate of p,
such that p

=

1 -

Y:zd,

p is approximated from the D-W statistic, d,

in accordance with Greene . 44 Only one iteration is

required and the final estimate of rho,

p

=

0.085.

For all the control variables in the two period fixed effects models of Table
6, the signs of the coefficients are exactly as expected. Contrasting the 2-way
fixed effects Levels model with the AR(1 ) corrected, period-fixed effects Changes
model, the transformation seems to have righted the signs for the effects of state
and local government programs (SLGCHGJJ and state-level energy costs
(STNRGYCHJ,t-1). The latter continues to be insignificant, as does the income
42
The procedure, as adapted from Gujarati (1 995) involves a two step process: (1 ) Obtain the
estimated error terms, �� from an OLS regression of the original model; (2} Regress the � on the

original regressors, plus the lagged value of the estimated error term, �-t· The resulting value of
R2 is then multiplied by (n - p) to produce the M statistic, which approximates c/ ( p is used to
denote the level of serial correlation; e.g., p = 1 reflects a 1 st order autoregressive scheme).
43 M = (n - p} x R2 = (1 9-1 ) x 0.01 5 = 0.26. At the 95% level, the critical value of c1 2 is 3.84.
Since c 1 2 > M, H0: p 0 cannot be rejected.
=
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maintenance benefit payments variable (PCIMBPCHJ,t-1 ) . The percent other
private employment (POPECHGJ.t-1), coefficient of specialization (CSCHGJ,t- 1 ), and
farm employment (FARMCHGJJ change variables all become significant in the
Changes model. In fact, regarding expectations, the only adverse change

between the two models is the percent services employment variable loses its
significance in the period-fixed effects, Changes AR(1 ) model .
Looking at the primary variables of interest, the defense instal lation
reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJJ is positive and highly significant, lending support
to Proposition (3) . Interestingly DEFCHGJt• though significant, is opposite in sign
from what most would expect. The negative coefficient seems to suggest that
increases in defense employment lead to decreases in local private employment.
This is likely due to specification error that can be resolved through the
decomposition of defense personnel changes into negative and positive
elements. Decomposition is explored fol lowing the discussions on defense
county dummy varia bles, and lagged dependent variable i nstruments.

Defense County Dummy Variables

Since the time Spanish explorers and English settlers colonized America,
to the early 1 900s, the need to protect vital ports and trade routes drove
domestic military location and fortification strategies. But involvement in two
world wars and changes in technology - most notably, the ability to project power

44 Reference Greene (2000), equation (1 3-26), page 538, and related discussion on page 546.
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quickly and en masse - altered this causal relationship. By the mid-1 950s,
military instal lation location drove transportation infrastructure development. In
fact, a major justification for the Federal Aid-H ighway Act of 1 956, which initiated
construction of 4 1 ,000 miles of interstate highways, was the support of rapid and
large-scale troop mobilization (Cox, 1 996) . Combined with the boom in
automobile ownership, this nodal transportation network made America the
mobile society it is today. Not surprisingly, economic studies give recognition to
the link between public highway spending and regional employment growth (e.g.,
Dalenberg, et.al., 1 998; Fox and Murray, 1 991 ) .
In either of the a bove instances - bases following trade routes, or
highways and railways accommodating bases - it is fair to a ssume military
installations are indicators of regions characterized by greater than average
growth potential. The effect of this growth rate differential can be captured
through an installation age variable in the Levels model. I ntuitively, the
expectation is that the longer an installation is in place, the higher the expected
level of employment attributable to the accompanying transportation network.
However, the data set at hand does not include installation age information.
Fortunately, the Changes model presents an opportunity to bypass this
shortcoming. Recognizing the Changes model simply involves first differencing,
the resulting installation age differences will a lways take a value of one, even if
the actual age is unknown. In other words, under the Changes model, dummy
variables used to identify counties with a defense presence are the l iteral
equivalent of installation age variables in the Levels model .
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Defense county dummy variables serve another purpose as well: they
capture the effect of military retiree location trends. Specifically, there is a
propensity for military retirees to establish residence near DoD bases. In
essence, the variety of benefits available through military installations (e.g.,
medical, legal, chaplain services, tax-free retail shopping, etc.) plus the fertile
market for military skills and experience exacts a "magnetic pull" on retiring
members when they select their next community of residence. Dardia's 1 995
study of BRAC impacts in California, and the 1 998 GAO review of prior B RAC
rounds give recognition to this phenomenon. This location trend translates to
additional induced employment effects for counties with a defense presence.
Accordingly, the litera l Changes model is appended to include defense county
dummies (DEFDVJ) as proxies for developed transportation infrastructure a nd the
"retiree effect." The results are presented in Table 7 .
Inclusion of defense county dummy variables has no effect on the signs or
significance of the parameter estimates, with the exception of lagged change in
state energy cost (STNRGYCHJ,t-t), which becomes significant in this model
variation . The defense personnel change variable (DEFCHGJJ is highly
significant and its magnitude decreases by 24 percent, but it is still negative. As
expected, the defense county dummy variable (DEFDVJ) is positive, and highly
significant. Disregarding lagged dependent variable and defense decomposition
issues, the estimated value for DEFDVJ suggests 751 jobs per year are
attributable to relatively better developed highway, rail, air, and sea
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Table 7 Changes Model with
Defense County Dummy Variable
-

Dependent Variable: EMPCHG 11

Period Fixed Effects (t)
Corrected for Autocorrelation
T-Stat

Coeff
1\t

not shown
750.89

•
- 3.09 •
20.82 • •

2.1 0

1 0.22 ••

-0. 1 6

DEFCHG1t
DEFDV1
LANDCHG1t

-2. 1 0 .

SlNRGYCHt.t-1

-85. 1 9

PPICHG1.t-l

355.09

6.93 • •

1 .1 1

35 . 7 1 ••

SLGCHG1t

-1.1 1

-0.61

PCIMBPCHt.t-1

1 45.66

8.68 ••

PCFEACHGt.t-1

3.23

2 . 62 ••

DNSITYCH1.t-1

9340.41

1 5. 1 4 ••

PWRCHG1,1-1

1 .1 9

909.40

PSRVCCHGt.t-1

1 604.57

2.76 ••

-458 1 .1 8

-5.38 ••

FARMCHG1t

1.14

1 0.48 ••

EMPCHGt.t-1

0.60

Final est. of Rho

0.09

1 84.39 ••
•
22 . 1 4 •

POPECHG1,t-l
CSCHGt.t-1

(counties, n

=

3092; periods, T

=

19)

• Significant at the 95 percent level.
•• Significant at the 99 percent level.

Note:

Model corrected for first order autocorrelation.
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transportation networks, a long with induced effects of retiree convergence, in
defense counties .

Instruments for the Lagged Dependent Variable

Suppose for a moment the disturbance term is not completely random, but
rather takes the form EJt = Ut + vJ + WJt• or EJt = vJ + WJt· As noted at the outset,
complications arise in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Specifically,
in either case, under the Levels model, EMPJt is a function of vJ and EMPJ,t-1 . But
this means EMPJ,t-1 is also a function of vJo This violation of the least squares
assumption that right side variables are independent of the error term results in
biased estimates. First differencing under the Changes model a ppears to
alleviate this concern as vJ drops out (i.e., vJ - VJ = 0) . This is exactly the first step
in remedies suggested by Baltagi (1 995) and others. As it is, this step has
a lready been taken, even though preliminary test results point toward the fixed
effects specifications over the random effects ones, suggesting the disturbance
term does not contain either period or region components. But concerns with the
lagged dependent variable do not end here.
While much of the literature is concerned with lagged dependent variable
problems in the random effects models only, Greene (2000) , and Arellano and
Honore (1 999) note difficulties may exist in the fixed effects form as well.
Specifically, EMPJ,t-1 is correlated with 'PJ by design in the Levels region (or region
and period) fixed effects model. Additionally, EMPJ,t- 1 is correlated with EJt• even
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under the assumption that EJt is not serially correlated. First differencing to the
Changes form removes the heterogeneity, but as seen in equation (1 1 ), a

correlation problem between the lagged dependent variable and the disturbance
still exists.

EMPCHGJt =
EMPJt - EMPJ.t-1

=

� ' (XJt - XJ,t-1 )

+ y' (EMPJ,t- 1

- EMPJ,t-2)

+

(EJt - EJ,t-1)

(1 1 )

The recommended solution is to employ an instrumental variable for
EMPCHGJ ,t-1 · Baltagi (1 995) and Greene (2000) identify EMPCHGJ,t-2 (= EMPJ,t-2 EMPJ.t-3) , and EMPJ.t-2 as two via ble contenders. As Kennedy (1 997) and Kmenta
(1 997) caution, these instruments are not simply substituted for EMPCHGJ.t- 1 · or
they would function merely as proxies, yielding inconsistent estimates. I nstead,
they are applied in the first step of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) routine, as
described in Markus (1 979). The resulting fitted values are then substituted for
EMPCHGJ.t- 1 in the second step, producing coefficient estimates that are
consistent and unbiased. As Kennedy (1 997) and Greene (2000) note, under
instrumental variable estimation techniques, the variance-covariance matrix is
larger than under simple OLS, so estimates may not be efficient. But, Kmenta
(1 997) shows the degree of instrumental variable driven variance is inversely
related to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the chosen
instrument. U nder the circumstances, this compromise is deemed accepta ble.
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The model in equation (1 O) is appended using first EMPCHGJ,t-2• then EMPJ.t-2 as
instrumental variables for EMPCHGJ.t-1 · The results are reported in Table 8.
Clearly, there is an appreciable difference in outcomes between the two
instrumental variable choices. Specifically, in the second model of Table 8
{where EMPJ.t-2 is the instrument), the signs for the defense county dummy
variable (DEFDVJ). the lagged change in energy cost (STNRGYCHJ.t-1), the
change in state and local government employment (SLGCHGJJ, and the lagged
change in population density (DNSITYCHJ.t-1 ) are opposite of both their expected
signs and the results obtained when EMPCHGJ,t-2 is used as the instrument.
Furthermore, the coefficient estimate of 1 . 31 for EMPJ.t-2 is counterintuitive given
this represents 1-A (recall in a partial adjustment model, the value of A is
constrained such that 0 � A � 1 ) .
Examination of the correlation between these two instruments and the
lagged dependent variable reveals EMPCHGJ,t-2 is the better choice. Specifically,
neither instrument is contemporaneously correlated with the disturbance term,
but rxy for EMPCHGJ.t-2 and EMPCHGJ,t-1 is 0.7 1 8, whereas the correlation
coefficient for EMPJ,t-2 and EMPCHGJ.t-2 is 0.466. Keeping with Kmenta (1 997)
then, the size of the variance-covariance matrix is minimized through the choice
of EMPCHGJ.t-2· The larger variance under the EMPJ.t-2 instrument likely explains
the disparities above. Consequently, through the remainder of the study,
EMPCHGJ,t-2 serves as the instrumental variable remedy for lagged dependent
variable concerns.
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Table 8 -

Changes Model with

Lagged Dependent Variable Instruments

Dependent Variable:

EMPCHGJt

EMPCHG*.t .t-t lnstrument: EMP1,1-2

EMPCHG*.J,t- t lnstrument: EMPCHG1,,_z

Coeff

Coeff

T-Stat

not shown

&
DEFCHG11
DEFDV1
LANDCHG11
STNRGYCH1.t- 1
PPICHG1.t-1

-0.21

-3.79

••

1 741 .97

28.75

••
••

1 .7 1

6.40

-35.47

-0.88

299.99

5 .73

&
DEFCHG1,
DEFDVt
LANDCHGit
STNRGYCH u- 1

••

PPICHGt.t-1

38.20 . .

T-Stat

not shown
-0.45
- 1 7 0 .00

-8.51

••

-2.29 .
••

1 .81

6 . 90

38.92

1 .05

1 304.00

25.61

••

-2.52

-36.07

••

9.1 5

1 7.1 4

••

SLGCHG1,

1 .47

PCIMBPCHi.t-1

0.09

0. 1 7

1 20.79

7.1 1

••

PWRCHGt.t-1

45.99

2.92 .

PCFEACHG1 .t- 1

3.08

2.67

••

PCFEACHGt.t-1

1 0. 1 1

9.53

••

DNSITYCHt.t-1

1 2356.80

1 5.54

••

DNSITYCHt.t-1

-9074.75

-1 0 . 82

••

PSRVCCHG1.t- 1

554.34

0.75

PSRVCCHGt.t- 1

2 1 48.98

3. 1 3

•

1 223.94

2.16

3009.45

5 . 74

••

-3922.29

-4.63

••

POPECHGt .t- t

-1 1 2 2 1 . 20

- 1 4.1 9

••

FARMCHG1,

0.89

8 . 24

••

FARMCHG1,

1 .25

1 2.45

••

EMPCH(;t .t-2

0.26

40.60

••

1 .31

72.35

••

Final est. of Rho

0.52

1 45.90

••

EMPt .t-2
Final est. of Rho

0.56

1 65.54

••

PWRCHGt.t-1

POPECHGt,t-1
CSCHGt.t-1

(counties, n

SLGCHG1,
PCIMBPCHt.t- 1

•

=

CSCHG1.t-1

3092; periods, T = 19)

*

Significant at the 95 percent level.
Significant at the 99 percent level .
N otes: 1 . Observed values for the instruments EMPCHGJ.t-2 a nd EMPJ .t-2 represent the
fitted values for EMPCHGJ .t-1 when it is regressed on the original independent
variables and the respective instrument is substituted for EMPCHGJ,t-1 on the
right-hand side (the equation and results when the instrument is E MPCHGj,t-2 is
provided in Appendix B) .
••

2. Models corrected for first order autocorrelation.
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When compared with the Changes model before instruments (Table 7),
the differences in results with EMPCHGJ.t-2 as the lagged dependent variable
instrument a re fairly minor. For example, the negative amenity proxy, lagged
change in per ca pita income maintenance benefit payments (PCIMBPCHJ ,t-1) is
the only variable that reverses sign . But in both cases, this coefficient tests
insignificant. The remaining variables have the expected signs in both models,
with the exception of the primary variable of interest, DEFCHGJt· Again, its
upcoming decomposition into positives and negative elements allows closer
scrutiny. Only the cost of living proxy, Jagged change in energy cost
(STNRGYCHJ ,t-1) , loses its significance moving from the lagged dependent
variable model to the instrumental variable variation. Final ly, the move to the
instrumental variable model doubles the magnitude of the defense county effect.

Decomposition of Personnel Changes and "Closure Clocks "

Though model specifications thus far facilitate examination of Proposition
(1 ), in principle, the counterintuitive results realized and Proposition (2)
necessitate d issection , or decomposition of the defense personnel changes
variable into its positive and negative elements. What's more, Proposition (3)
can be better explored by dividing the negative personnel cha nges into two
subcategories: those related to on-going defense operations, and those tied
directly to base closures. The resulting three defense personnel change
variables are defined in Table 9.
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Table 9

-

Decomposed Defense Variables
Definition

Variable

PDEFCHGJt

Positive changes (i .e., increases) in military and defense
federal civilian employment from year t- 1 to year t. Observed
values for this variable are always � 0 .

NDEFCHGJt

Ordinary (non-BRAC related) negative changes in military
and defense federal civilian employment from year t- 1 to
year t. Observed values for this variable are always � 0.

BDEFCHGJt

BRAC related changes in military and defense federal
civilian employment from year t- 1 to year t. Nonzero values
are reflected for this variable beginning the first year
following the corresponding BRAC when levels begin to draw
down, and thereafter. Observed values are always � 0 .

Notes:

1 . Measures are at the county level
2. j denotes county j
3. t denotes year t ·

Another noteworthy consideration is the effect of psychic shock associated
with base closure selection and announcement. There is substantial anecdotal
evidence of adverse reactions to these events. For example, Dardia et. al.
(1 995) contains a number of pessimistic forecasts developed by community
leaders of effected areas in California. Kitfield (1 995) paints a bleak picture of
San Antonio's shock over the announcement to close the depot at Kelly AFB.
The Economist reports Sacramento's response to the selection of McClellan AFB
is a kin to rats leaving a sinking ship: "Many people are already trying to sell [their
homes] before the flood of surplus houses hits the market."45 While there is no

45 See "The McClellan Factor," 1 995.
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widespread evidence to suggest closure communities on the whole faired poorly
or dried up as anticipated, it is conceivable that businesses on the verge of
starting up or locating in these communities at the time of announcement may
have shared similar fears and delayed, or curtailed their plans. One way to
capture this psychic shock effect is via a "closure clock" dummy variable regime.
Specifically, a series of county-level dummies marking the year of base closure
announcement, and the subsequent five years is examined. 46 The purpose of
these dumm ies is to capture the effects of unobservable B RAC factors such as
community a pprehension and optimism. Also embedded in these dummy
variables is the effect of over one billion dollars in BRAC related federal
economic relief for which details could not be obtained . 47 Exploration of this
dummy regime was deferred until this point since these variables cannot be
strictly transformed between the Levels and Changes modeling forms without
losing economic meaning. The "closure clock" dummies are defined in Table 1 0.
A firm basis does not exist for detai led expectations of signs and
magnitudes for each of these dummy variables; only relative generalities can be
made. Assuming media descriptions accurately reflect community anxiety,
negative coefficients are expected for the first few years. But, as anxiety gives
way to less-than-disastrous reality, and as community assistance arrives, these
variables likely become less negative, or even positive where they capture

46

Under base closure law, BRAG actions had to be completed within six years of a given base's
selection. The TnJt dummy regime covers that interval.
47 See discussion of Economic Relief, beginning on page 21 .
95

Table

1 0 - BRAC "Closure Clock" Dummy Variables
Definition

Variable

Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if county j hosts a
BRAC installation and t is the year this county first came
under BRAC; otherwise Tjt = 0.
Dummy variables {n = 1 to 5) which take a value of 1 if
county j hosts a B RAC i nstal lation and t is the rih year after
this county came under BRAC; otherwise Tlljt = 0.
Notes:

1 . j denotes county J
2. t denotes year t

reutil ization phenomena not reflected in the installation reutilization proxy,
LANDCHGJt·
Substituting PDEFCHGJt. NDEFCHGJt. and BDEFCHGJt for DEFCHGJt;
adding the "closure clock" dummy regime; and employing EMPCHGJ,t-2 as the
instrumental variable for EMPCHGJ,t-1 {denoted EMPCHG*J,t-1 ) yields the
specification presented in equation {1 2). Results of the decomposed defense
personnel changes model, with and without the "closure clock" dummy regime,
are presented in Table 1 1 .
With the exception of the BRAC related personnel change variable
{BDEFCHGJ,j, the inclusion of a BRAC dummy regime does not appear to
materially affect the other variables when the two models of Table 1 1 are
compared. The anticipated outcome for the "closure clock" variables is more or
less real ized. Specifically, negative employment effects characterize the first
year following announcement. This is in line with conjectures of community
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EMPCHGJt = At
+ A.B1 aPDEFCHGJt
+ A.B 1bNDEFCHGJt
+ A.B1 cBDEFCHGJt
+ A.BzDEFDVJ
+ A.B3LANDCHGJt
+ A.B4TOJt
+ A.B5T 1Jt
+ A.BsT2Jt
+ A.B1T3Jt
+ A.BsT4Jt
+ A.BgTSJt
+ A.--(1STNRGYCHJ.t-1
+ A.yzPPICHGJ,t-1
+ A"f3SLGCHGJt
+ A.y4PCIMBPCHJ .t-t
+ A.y5PWRCHGJ,t-t
+ A.ysPCFEACHGJ.t-1
+ A."fTDNSITYCHJ ,t-1
+ A.ysPSRVCCHGJ.t-1
+ A.y9POPECHGJ.t-1
+ A."(IOCSCHGJ,t- 1
+ A.yuFARMCHGJt
+ (1 -A.) EMPCHG\t-1
+ eJt
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A.B1a
A-B1 b
A- B le
A.B2
A.B3
A.B4
A.Bs
A.B6
A-B1
A.Bs
A.B9

A"(I

A.y2
A.y3
A.y4
A"fs
A.y6
A.y1
A"(s
A.yg
A.yw
A'Yn
{ 1 -A.)

( 1 2)
>0
<0
<0
>0
>0
?
?
?
?
?
?

<0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0
>0
>0
>0
<0
>0
>0

Table

11

-

Decomposed

Changes Model and "Closure C lock"
Dummies

Dependent Variable: EMPCHG11

Decomposed Defense with
"Closure Clock" Dummies

Decomposed Defense
T-Stat

Coeff
At.

not shown

PDEFCHGtt

0.48

4.75

NDEFCHG II

-0.68

-7.48

BDEFCHGII

-0.96

-5.36

1 630.56

26.42

1.17

3.96

DEFDV1
LANDCHGu

Coeff

T-Stat

not shown

••
••
••
••
••

0.48

4.79

-0.67

-7.35

-0.60

-3.08

1 582.35

25.46

1 .22

4.1 1

••
•
•

••

1 52.38

0.46

T l tt

-548.21

-1 .47

T2tt

1 608.67

4.23

Tl11

1 079.60

2.33 .

T4it

4741 .70

TS11
STNRGYCH1.1-1

- 3 4.37

-0.85

PPICHG1,t-l

297.64

5.68

SLGCHG1,

1 .46

3 8.02

0.07

0. 1 2

PWRCHG 1 L1,t-1

1 2 1 .06

7.1 3

PCFEACHG1.t-1

3.08

2.68

DNSITYCHu-1

1 2354.30

1 5 .54

PCIMBPCHu- 1

PSRVCHGu-1

568.77

POPECHG1,t-1

1 239.01
0.90

8.35

(IV: EMPCHGt.t-z)

0.26

40.64

Final est. of Rho

0.51

1 45.42

EMPCHG *t.t-1

(counties, n
•

••

Note:

••
••
••

0.77
-4.63

FARMCHGtt

••

=

••
••

••
••

3092; periods, T

Significant at the 95 percent level.
Significant at the 99 percent level.
Models corrected for first order autocorrelation.

98

3.27

-33.89

-0.84

295.07

5.64

1 .46

37.98

0.09

0.1 6

1 20.45

7.1 0

3.06

2.66

1 231 3.60

1 5.51

596.70

0.80

1 2 64.74

2.1 8 .

-391 7.27

CSCHG1.1-1

••

1 7 31 .74

=

19)

•

••

TOu

1 0.76

•

••

••

••

••
••

••
••
••

2 . 23 .

-3924.61

-4.64

0.86

7.97

0.26

40.41

0.5 1

1 45.06

••
••

••

••

apprehension, and uncertainty on the part of business planners. However,
coefficients for the announcement year and the subsequent year do not test
significantly different from 0. Years two through five reflect positive and
significant employment effects, with year four being most pronounced. It may be
that year four at closure sites typically marks the peak for returns on reutilization
and economic assistance measures (recall for B RACs '88 and '91 , time to
closure averaged between 5 Yz and 3 Yz years, respectively) .
I n moving from the consolidated defense change equiva lent on the left
side of Table 8, to the decomposed models of Table 1 1 , the signs and
significance for installation reutilization (LANDCHGJ.J and the control variables
remain unchanged. Again, only the coefficient of the lagged change in per capita
income maintenance benefit payments variable (PCIMBPCHj.t- 1 ) is opposite the
expected direction. But, like the lagged change in state-level energy costs and
percent change i n service industry employment variables (STN RGYCHj.t- 1 and
PSRVCHGj.t- 1 ) , this one still does not test significant. N onetheless, all three of
these are retained with the belief they are relevant industry location and
migration determinants.
A closer look at the relationship between percent chaJlge in other private
employment (POPECHGJ.t-1 ) and percent change in service industry employment
(PSRVCHGJ.t- 1 ) may offer some insight into why the apparent effect of the latter on
non-farm private employment is insignificant. To begin with, these two
independent variables are highly, a nd negatively correlated (r

=

-0 . 540) . With

regard to regional industry restructuring only, this negative relationship stands to
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reason; the third sector (manufacturing) cannot be expected to bear all the shifts
into and out of the other two sectors (i.e., gains to services may come at the
expense of losses to non-farm private employment sectors other than
manufacturing) .
The numbers behind Figure 3 offer some quantitative clarification . From
1 97 7 to 1 997, non-farm private employment in the U .S . grew 57%. Within the
service industry, employment growth for the same period was more than double
the overall rate (1 20%) . At the same time, manufacturing declined 4%, while the
remaining sectors grew 35% in aggregate. The relative magnitudes of these
values suggest percent change in other private employment is a viable predictor
of regional growth . For example, through simple extrapolation of the numbers
above, one might reasonably hypothesize a 1 % increase in other private
employment leads to employment increases across services and manufacturing
combined, by up to 0.63% [1 - (0. 57/0.35)]. On the other hand, these growth
trends make it difficult to develop a similar hypothesis for service industry
employment. Clearly, a substantial amount of the growth in services is due to
industry restructuring, rather than all new employment. Therefore, this variable is
a weak indicator since it embodies both these effects, with the former effect
being very pronounced . That does not necessarily preclude the use of a percent
change in service industry employment variable. But it does imply the effects of
the two industry structure variables should be viewed together, rather than in
isolation.
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Interestingly, the decomposition of the defense personnel change variable
has very little impact on the remaining variables. As stated, the signs and
significance test results are unchanged. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the
control variables generally vary by less than one percent. Only the coefficient of
the installation reutilization variable (LANDCHGJ,J varies appreciably, decreasing
from an estimated effect of 1 . 71 jobs ga ined per parceled acre, to 1 . 1 7 .
The three defense personnel change variables, PDEFCHGJtr NDEFCHGJtr
and BDEFCHGJ1 a ll have the expected signs. Specifically, the positive coefficient
for PDEFCHGJ1 su pports Proposition (1 ): increases in military base labor force
levels spur demand driven positive indirect employment effects in the
surrounding communities. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests these
indirect employment effects are on the order of 0.48 (e.g., in the short run, 1 00
new defense jobs create 48 new civilian jobs, for a net gain of 1 48 jobs) . The
negative coefficient for NDEFCHGJt supports Proposition (2) : supply driven factors
such as freed labor and community infrastructure under routine (i.e., non-BRAC)
draw downs yield positive employment pressures on local communities . This
outcome is defended, in part, by the labor force redistributive effects of defense
dynamics, as discussed on page 43 .
At first glance, the negative defense change (NDEFCHGJt) coefficient value
of -0.67 in the "closure clock" model of Table 1 1 a ppears excessive - especially
relative to the coefficient value of 0.48 for positive defense changes (PDEFCHGJJ ·
But looking back at F igure 1 on page 9 , it should b e noted the period of review
(i.e. , 1 977 - 1 997) covered defense personnel shifts after the manning peak of
101

1 968, at which time defense infrastructure adequately supported 4 . 9 million
personnel. So in many cases, positive defense personnel changes involved
reutilizing existing, but idle public facilities . Consequently, the coefficient for
PDEFCHGJt is dampened compared to what may have been realized if all
personnel increases during this period necessitated the construction and upkeep
of completely new facilities. At the same time, defense personnel downsizing
during this period did not always translate to defense spending decreases. This
becomes evident in F igure 8, where the mid-70's through late 80's experienced
disproportionate growth in spending.
The concept of outsourcing defense operations, which came into vogue
during in the early 80's, can help explain the divergence between defense
personnel levels and spending in Figure 8. In short, the DoD began transferring
functions not considered inherently governmental from their federal employees to
defense contractors. As a uniformed member walked out the door one day, a
defense industry employee who fulfilled the same function (often the same
individual) replaced the defense worker shortly thereafter. While incorporation of
related spending data would certainly control for these effects, regrettably such
data are not available. Specifically, current summary records only track these
expenditures to the point of payment (e.g., the prime contractor's corporate
headquarters), which may differ from the benefiting community, or even state.
This limitation is duly noted in a number of related studies (e.g., Hooker a nd
Knetter, 1 997; Brauer and Marlin, 1 992; Cumberland, 1 973). U nder similar
circumstances, -0.67 is probably representative of the effects of non-BRAC
1 02
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defense personnel downsizing actions. But in the case of downsizing "without
substitution," this estimate is likely biased upward in magnitude. Nonetheless,
the redistributive effects of defense la bor force dynamics a nd other factors
related to downsizing -- such as suppressed rents, decrease property values,
and excess labor supply -- are certain to exert favorable industry location and
employment pressures.
The results for the BRAG related personnel reductions (BDEFCHGJt) , along
with the installation reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJJ support Proposition {3).
Specifically, the negative sign for BDEFCHGJtr coupled with the positive sign for
1 03

LANDCHGJt imply base closure impacts are mitigated to some extent by the
community infrastructure vacuum created through departure of military residents,
and by efforts to promote private reutilization of otherwise idle defense facilities.
The magnitude of the LANDCHGJt coefficient is about the same across both
models in Table 1 1 , again suggesting short run effects are 6 new jobs created for
every 5 acres of reutilized land . In the "closure clock" dummy variable model of
Table 1 1 , the magnitude of the BDEFCHGJt coefficient estimate drops
substantially, from -0.96 to -0.60. It appears BDEFCHGJt was picking up some
of the effects of state and federal economic aid before inclusion of the "closure
clock" dummy regime.
The observations in the data set reflect total acreage released as of
November 2000, allocated across the preceding periods, in proportion to BRAG
related personnel reductions. Consequently, LANDCHGJt and BDEFCHGJt are
highly correlated. G iven this approach assumes facilities were released
immediately as they became available, yet media reports and O EA records
suggest substantial delays were involved, examination of lagged LANDCHGJt
values may a lleviate some of the collinearity problem while painting a more
realistic picture of actual events. This avenue is explored next.

Lagged Installation Reutilization Proxies

The second model of Table 1 1 is rerun with the installation reutilization
proxy, LANDCHGJt• lagged one, two, then three periods to examine the role of
delays in facility conveyance efforts. The results of these three models are
1 04

presented in Table 1 2. While size, significance, and signs of the control
variables do not change markedly, in all three models the a bsolute magnitude of
BDEFCHGjt increases somewhat (from -0.60 in Table 1 1 , to -0.87, -1 .01 , and
-0.87 in the respective first, second, and third Jag models of Ta ble 1 2) . In the
absence of details regarding the actual pattern of conveyance delays, the third
lag model (LANDCHGJ,t-3) is the model of choice as more "closure clock"
dummies test significant in this specification than under the other three models.
The implicit assumption is that typically three years lapse before excessed
military land and facilities are put to productive private use.
The LANDCHGJ.t-3 model suggests the apprehension of closure
announcement represents a brief hiccup. The immediate release, or
decongestion of community infrastructure and housing, and the local surplus of
labor act to counter the apprehension, as businesses recognize an opportunity
for low cost startup, expansion, and production. The magnitude of BDEFCHGJt
suggests this occurs at a rate of 0.87 new jobs for every B RAC related job loss.
At the same time, private reutilization of defense facilities translates to around
two new jobs for every acre conveyed, though conveyance typically entails a
three-year delay, during which facilities remain idle. Finally, the effects of aid
related opportunism typical ly peak in the fourth year.

Industry Specialization and Defense-to-Labor Force Interactions

Propositions (4) and (5) examine the elasticities of the defense
employment effects modeled thus far, to regional industry structure and labor
1 05

Table

1 2 - Examination of Lagged Base Reutilization Proxies
Dependent Variable: EMPCHGJ1

At

LANDCHGJ,t-1

LANDCHGJ,t-z

Coeff

Coeff

T-Stat

not shown

PDEFCHG1t

0.48

4 .76

NDEFCHGJt

- 0.66

-7.27

BDEFCHG1t

- 0.87

-4.88

1 57 8 . 1 6

25 .40

DEFDV1

ILANDcHG1z

1 .62

5 .97

1 5 9. 1 3

0.48

T l tt

-472.92

-1 .27

T2Jt

1 45 7 . 28

3 .83

T3Jt

71 1 . 1 6

1 .52

T4Jt

4355 .07

9.79

T51,

1 649.99

3.1 1

-32 .92

-0.82

TOJt

STNRGYCHJ,t-1
PPICHG1.t-1

295.63

5 . 65

SLGCHGJt

1 .45

37 .90

PCIMBPCH1,t-1

0.06

0. 1 1

1 20.27

7.09

PCFEACHGJ.t-1

3 .04

2 . 64

DNSITYCHJ.t-1

PWRCHG lL.J.t-1

1 2367 .00

1 5 . 59

PSRVCHG1 .t-1

587.96

0 . 79

POPECHGJ.t-1

1 263.57

2.23

-3937.52

-4.65

0 . 85

7.91

(IV: EMPCHGJ,t-z)

0.26

40.45

Final est. of Rho

0.51

1 44.94

CSCHGJ,t-1
FARMCHGJt
EMPCHG*t .t-1

•

••

0.49

4.80

-0.6 7

- 7.32

-1 .01

- 5 .72

1 572.53

25.31

2.31

8.8 4

1 58.55

0.47

••
••
••
••

••

••
••

••
••

••
••
••

•

-543.29

- 1 .46

1 602.58

4.22

569.44

1 .22

4032.03

9.01

1 1 62 . 3 5

2.17

-32.89

-0.82

294 . 3 7

5 .63

1 . 46

38. 1 3

0.06

0.1 1

1 20.09

7 .08

3 . 05

2 . 65

1 2388.90

1 5 .62

601 .88

0.81

1 261 .60

••
••

- 4.64

0.87

8.04

0 . 26

40. 1 8

0.51

1 45.08

••

=

3092; periods, T

S iqnificant at the 95 percent level.
Siqnificant at the 99 percent level.

Note: Models corrected for first order autocorrelation.
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Coeff

••
••
••
••

••

••

••
•

••
••

••
••
••

2.23 .

-3919.87

••

(counties, n

T-Stat

not shown

••

LANDCHGJ,t-3

=

19)

••

••

••

••

T-Stat

not shown
0.49

4.81

-0.68

-7.42

-0.87

-4.88

1 572.85

25.31

2 .05

5.66

1 54.47
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-472.47

-1 .27

1 7 1 0. 3 3

4 . 50

1 22 1 .3 3

2 .63

4459.68

1 0.06

1 552.28

2 .91

-32.48

-0.81

293 .74

5 .61

1 .46

38.05

0.09

0. 1 7

1 20. 1 2

7 .08

3 .05

2.65

1 2 358.00

1 5 .58

592.66

0.80

1 265.94

2.23

-3926.07

- 4.64

0.88

8.1 2

0.26

40. 1 9

0.51

1 44.90

••
••
••
••
••

••
••
••
••

••
••

••
••
••

•
••
••

••

••
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force size relative to defense presence. Specifically, Proposition (4) states that
regions with highly specialized industry are less sensitive to military base
employment changes because these regions likely thrive on export activities.
Proposition (5) states base employment effects are more pronounced in regions
with relatively smaller non-defense employment because these regions are less
likely to have achieved their ful l potential for scale economies . To accommodate
examination of these propositions, the model in equation (1 2) is modified with
interaction terms. Specifically, equation (1 3) incorporates lagged values of the
changes in industry specialization (CSCHGJ ,t- 1) and defense-to-labor force ratio
(D2LFCHGJ,t-1) . 48
The expectations that support propositions (4) and (5) can also be
expressed in simple form through the first derivative of the dependent variable
with respect to each element of the decomposed defense personnel change
variable . This form is presented in equations (1 4) through (1 6), along with
expectations of the overal l signs.
Note that a lagged value of the change in defense-to-labor force ratio
(D2LFCHGJ,t-1) is included in equation (1 3) as a stand a lone variable.

This is to

gauge if the significance of the combined term is driven purely by the interaction
component (as noted previously, CSCHGJ,t-1 is already in the model as an industry

48 This specification of the interactions cannot be literally transformed back to the Levels form of
the model with economic meaning. Keeping with the intent of developing a true Changes model,
the interactions are modeled with changes rather levels for these two terms. The interpretation of
these lagged terms still holds. For example, increases in industry specialization and decreases in
the ratio of defense personnel to the local labor force are expected to dampen the effects of the
primary variable (PDEFCHGJt, NDEFCHGJt, or BDEFCHGjtr as the case may be).
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EMPCHG1t

= At

+ A.P 1aPDEFCHGJt
+ A.Pu,PDEFCHG1t*CSCHG1.t-1
+ A.P 1cPDEFCHGJt*D2LFCHGJ.t-1

+ A.PtdNDEFCHGJt
+ A.P 1eNDEFCHG1t*CSCHGJ.t-1

+ A.PlfNDEFCHG11*D2LFCHG1.t-1
+ A.p 1gBDEFCHGjt
+ A.P1hBDEFCHG1t*CSCHGJ.t-1
+ A.PuBDEFCHG1t*D2LFCHG1.t-1
+ A.P2DEFDVJ
+ A.P3LANDCHG1.t-3
+ A.p4TOJt
+ A.PsT 1Jt
+ A.PsT2Jt
+ A.p7T31t

+ A.PsT4Jt
+ A.J3gT51t
+ A.p!OD2LFCHG1 .t-1

+ A.y1STNRGYCHJ.t-1
+ A.y2PPICHG1.t-1
+ A.y3SLGCHG1t
+ A.y4PCIMBPCH1.t-1
+ A.ysPWRCHGJ.t-t

+ A.ysPC FEACHGJ.t-1
+ A.y1DNSITYCH1 .t-1
+ A.ysPSRVCCHGJ,t-1
+ A.ygPOPECHG1.t-1
+ A.y10CSCHG1.t-1
+ A.yuFARMCHG1t
+ AY1 2CSJ.t-t

+ (1-A.) EMPCHG\t-2

+ E':lt
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A.P 1a > 0
A.P 1b < o
A.P 1c > 0

A.P 1d < 0
A.P 1e > 0
A.P 1r < 0
A.P 1 s < o
A.P 1h > o
A.P u < 0
A.p2 > 0
A.p3

A.p
4
A.Ps
A.p6
A.�
A.Ps

A.pg
A.P 10
A.y1
A.y2
A.y3

A.y
4
A.ys
A.y6
A.y1

>0
?

?

?

?

?

?

?

<0
>0

>0

<0
>0
>0

>0
A.ys > 0
A.y9 > 0
A.yw < 0
A.yu > 0

AY12 < 0
(1-A.) > 0

(1 3)

()EMPCHGJtlaPDEFCHGJt
=

A.�ta + A.�1 bCSCHGJ.t-1
( +)
(-)

+

A.�tcD2LFCHGJ ,t-1
( +)

>

0

(1 4)

+

A.�uD2LFCHGJ,t-t
(-)

<

0

(1 5)

+

A.�uD2LFCHGJ, t-1
()

<

0

(1 6)

()EMPCHGJti()NDEFCHGJt
=

A.� td + A.�1eCSCHGJ.t-1
(-)
(+)

aEMPCHGJti()BDEFCHGJt
=

A.� tg + A.�1 hCSCHGJ,t-t
(-)
( +)

-

location control variable) . A priori arguments cannot be made either way about
the direction of D2LFCHGJ,t-1 · so this stand a lone variable carries no anticipated
sign . The results of the decomposed Changes model with "closure clock"
dummies, a three-year lagged installation reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJ,t-J), and
interaction terms are presented in Table 1 3 .
The first thing that becomes apparent from Table 1 3 is that significance,
signs, and magnitudes for the non-defense variable coefficients are not materially
different after inclusion of the interaction terms. Secondly, the signs for
PDEFCHGJt*CSCHGJ,t-1 . NDEFCHGJ1*CSCHGJ,t-1· and BDEFCHGJ1*D2LFCHGJ,t-1 are
consistent with Propositions (4) and (5) . However, with the exception of
BDEFCHGJt*D2LFCHGJ,t-I. none of the interaction terms test significantly d ifferent
from zero in magnitude. This suggests changes in the local defense-to-la bor
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Table

13

Examination of Lagged
I nteraction Terms
-

Dependent Variable: EMPCHG 11
T-Stat

Coeff

not shown

At

0.48

4.68

-1 .66

-0. 1 6

PDEFCHGu*DZLFCHGt .t-1

-0.25

-0.95

NDEFCHG11

-0.68

-7.45

PDEFCHG1t
PDEFCHG11*CSCHGt.t·l

NDEFCHG11*CSCHGt.t-1

0.32

0.1 2

NDEFCHG11*DZLFCHGt.t-1

0.07

0.1 7

••

••

••

-1 .06

-5.62

BDEFCHG11*CSCHGt.t-1

-10.1 3

-0.47

BDEFCHG11*D2LFCHGu.1

- 24.87

-3.49

1 568.47

25.27

••

2 .01

5.54

••

BDEFCHG1t

DEFDV1
LANDCHG1.t-3
T01t

1 50.56

0.45

T l1t

-393.07

-1 .05

••

T21t

1 81 4.93

4.74

••

T31t

1 283.22

2 . 76

••

T411

4564.59

1 0 .26

••

T51t

1 567.47

2 . 94

••
••

2 2 . 32

2 . 89

STNRGYCH1 .t-1

-32.78

-0. 81

PPICHG1.1. 1

292 .90

5 .60

••

SLGCHG11

1 .46

38.02

••

PCIMBPCH1.t-l

0. 1 0

0.1 7

DZLFCHGu-1

PWRCHG 1 L1.t·l

1 1 9.86

7 .06

••

PCFEACHG1.t-l

3 .06

2 . 66

••

DNSITYCH1.t-l

••

1 2353.90

1 5.57

PSRVCHG1 .t-t

6 1 0. 32

0.82

POPECHG1.t-l

1 270.70

CSCHG1.1-1

2 .2 4 .

-39 3 3 . 7 1

-4.64

••

0.89

8.26

••

0. 26

40.38

••

0 .51

1 44 . 60

••

FARMCHG1t
EMPCHG \t-1

(IV: EMPCHGj.,.z)

Final est. of Rho

(counties, n

=

3092; periods, T

•

Significant at the 95 percent level

••

Significant at the 99 percent level

=

19)

Note: Model corrected for first order autocorrelation
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force ratio materially influence the i mpact of defense personnel reductions.
Specifical ly, as this ratio becomes smaller, the favorable employment effects of
BRAC (i.e., freed labor and community infrastructure, and base facilities
reutilization) become less pronounced . 49 The insignificance of the other five
interactions suggests changes in the degree of regional industry specialization do
not materially influence the effects of defense personnel changes on local
employment. Likewise, county level employment effects of ordinary defense
workforce expansions and contractions are not sensitive to changes in the local
defense-to-labor force ratio.
As expected, the stand-alone variable representing lagged change in the
coefficient of specialization is negative and significant, implying specialized
regions do not general ly fair as wel l as those that are diversified . The coefficient
for the stand-alone lagged change in defense-to-labor force ratio (D2LFCHGJ,t-I)
is positive and significant. Coupled with the results for the
BDEFCHGJt*D2LFCHGJ.t-I interaction term, this seems to suggest employment in
counties with a greater military presence tends to grow at a faster rate than that
of counties with little or no military presence. This conclusion lends little support
to the Hooker and Knetter {1 999) argument that military salaries bring down
community earnings averages. If that were truly the case, the hypothesized

49 In general, BRAC related downsizing implies the local defense-to-labor force ratio is
decreasing, so observed values of D2LFCHGJ,t-I should be negative. In fact, where BRAC related
personnel changes occurred the mean value for D2LFCHGJ.t-l was -0.009.
111

lower average earnings should translate to smaller induced employment effects,
rather than faster growth .
G iven the many interaction terms of the model in Table 1 3, it is difficult to
interpret the overall employment effects of military bases without some
computation involving the three components for each type of defense personnel
change (refer to equations (1 4), (1 5), and (1 6) on page 1 09) . This is particularly
true in the case of B RAC related personnel changes, since one of the interaction
terms tests significantly different from 0. To address this concern, the coefficient
estimates from Ta ble 1 3 are multiplied with observed values of the interaction
terms, then summed, resulting in "fitted" employment impacts. The means for
these fitted values, plus their first and second standard deviation intervals, are
presented in Table 1 4 . To preclude skewing these figures toward 0, they are
based only on observations where PDEFCHGJt. NDEFCHGJt. and BDEFCHGJ11
respectively, did not reflect values of 0 (the number of inclusive observations is
noted) . Calculated va lues are reported for the period 1 979-97 (1 989-97 in the
case of BRAC related personnel changes), and then for the first and last years of
this interval for comparative purposes.
While there is very l ittle variability in the fitted values for ordinary negative
defense personnel changes, those of B RAC related personnel losses are
dispersed widely about the mean. This rough sketch of defense employment
effects seems to suggest that in general, the community infrastructure vacuum
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Table

1 4 - Fitted Effects of Defense Personnel Changes
on County Level Employment

Period

•

2SD

-1 SD

Mean

+ 1 SD

+ 2SD

Obs

0.64
1 .18
0.50

3645
1 97
1 40

Fitted Effects of Positive Defense Personnel Changes
1 979-97
1 979 only
1 997 only

0.32
-0.20
0.46

0.40
0.1 5
0.47

0.48
0.49
0.48

0.56
0.84
0.49

Fitted Effects of Ordinary Negative Defense Personnel Changes
1 979-97
1 979 only
1 997 only

-0.70
-0.75
-0.69

-0.69
-0.71
-0.68

-0.68
-0.67
-0.68

-0.67
-0.63
-0.68

-0.66
-0.59
-0.68

391 4
1 90
239

Fitted Effects of BRAC Related Negative Defense Personnel Changes
1 989-97
1 989 only
1 997 only

-2.08
-1 . 1 8
-1 .46

-1 .45
-1 .05
-1.18

-0.82
-0.91
-0.91
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-0.18
-0.78
-0.63

0.45
-0.65
-0.36

341
9
71

created through BRAC made for favorable employment conditions. 50 But, the
degree of these effects varies appreciably from base to base, and in few cases,
favorable effects are not present. Interestingly, the mean value of -0.82 is six
percent less than the estimate of -0.87 in the same model, before incorporation
of interaction terms. The failure to consider the elasticity of defense personnel
changes to changes in industry and workforce composition may have led to
some downward (negative) bias for this variable.

Long Run Employment Effects

Referring back to the development of the partial adjustment model in
equation (2), page 4 7, the coefficients for all the defense and control variables
include the a pportioning factor A,, such that 0 � A � 1 . The implication is that the
estimated coefficient values for all these variables represent the short run
component of their employment effects. As Greene (2000) notes, the
corresponding long run effects can be recovered utilizing the parameter estimate
for the lagged dependent variable (or it's instrument, in this study) . Specifically,
the coefficient for EMPCHG*j.t-1 is (1 - A.) in equation (2) . From Table 1 3, (1 - A.) =
0.26, so A = 0.74. Dividing coefficient estimates for the remaining variables in
Table 1 3 by 0.74 yields their estimated long run effects on county level non-farm
private employment. For example, the model results suggest the long run

50

Of the fitted values, 95 percent fall between -2.08 and 0.45, with an overall mean of -0.82.
Recall observed values for ordinary and BRAC related personnel decreases are negative, so
these negative coefficient estimates imply positive employment effects).
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employment effect of instal lation reutilization is 2.01 /0 . 74

=

2 . 70 jobs for every

acre divested . Estimated long run effects of defense personnel changes are
determined similarly. Using coefficient estimates from Table 1 2 (before
interactions) and the means from the fitted values on Table 1 4 (after
interactions) , long run employment effects are a pproximated in Table 1 5 .
The figures in Table 1 5 indicate the long run employment effects of
defense personnel increases are on the order of 0.65. In other words, for 1 00
new military base workers, outside employment increases by 48 in the year of
change, and by a total of 65 over the long run. This translates to a long run
multiplier of 1 .65. In periods of ordinary downsizing, the loss of 1 00 defense jobs
frees up the labor and community i nfrastructure necessary to attract a net of 68
new jobs in the year of change, and a total of 92 over the long run. The implied
long run multiplier for ordinary reductions, then, is 1 - 0.92

=

0.08. Finally, in the

case of BRAC related downsizing, the loss of 1 00 defense jobs frees up the
labor, community infrastructure, and defense facilities to generate a net of 82
new jobs in the year of change, and a total of 1 1 0 over the long run. This leads
to a long run multiplier of -0. 1 0 for B RAC related reductions. Once again, ca re
should be taken in interpreting multipliers for both ordinary and B RAC related
reductions. Specifically, these estimates are derived from data covering a period
when outsourcing was commonplace. Furthermore, over one billion dollars in
federal assistance was channeled to BRAC communities to aid in reutilization
efforts and provide economic relief. The details necessary to model and control
for both these factors were not available. At best, the "closure clock" dummy
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Table

15

-

Estimated Long Run Employment Effects

Before Interactions (Table

1 2)

After Interactions (Tab le

1 3)

Positive Personnel Changes

0.49 / 0.74

=

0.48 / 0.74

=

0.65

-0.68 / 0. 74

=

-0.92

=

-1 . 1 0

0.66

Ordi nary Negative Personnel Changes

-0.68 / 0.74

=

-0.91

BRAC Related Negative Personnel Changes

-0.8 7 I 0. 7 4

=

-1 . 1 6

-0.82 / 0. 74

regime captures a portion of the financial aid influence . The remaining effects of
these two factors are likely embedded in the ordinary and B RAC related
downsizing multipliers. Under similar conditions, similar results may be
expected . But, in the case where a id is not provided, or downsizing takes place
without substitution, or outsourcing, the favorable employment effects of defense
reductions are certain to be somewhat less than these estimates suggest.
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Chapter V
CONCLUSION

This empirical study explored the general effects of military installations on
local employment, and the special case of closure under the Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) proceedings of 1 988, 1 991 , 1 993, and 1 99 5 . A novel panel
data set incorporating 21 years of military and private industry observations for
963 military installations and 3,092 counties a llowed comprehensive modeling
and exa mination of defense related employment trends across all 50 states. The
collection of sub-county defense personnel figures addressed a shortcoming of
other county-level impact studies, which reconcile community employment
changes against base closure personnel losses, without consideration of
personnel dynamics at other military installations within the same county. To the
extent that counties host more than one base, resulting impact estimates of such
studies are biased . This outcome is highly likely given the data set revea led 88
counties hosting 97 major BRAC sites, were also home to 1 95 other military
facilities that continued operations through the draw downs.
Particular attention was given to the propositions that while increases in
defense personnel spur positive employment effects (+/+), ord inary personnel
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decreases, and those occurring under base closure conditions, exert favorable
employment pressures as well (-/+). These hypotheses run counter to
conventional wisdom. In particular, the implicit assumption of economic base
theory and input-output modeling techniques is that impacts of defense
personnel changes on local employment are symmetrical . I n other words, the
effects of employment bui ld-up are equal, but opposite in sign to those of job
removal . This conclusion stands to reason from a gross impact perspective. But
from a net impact perspective, this idea is challenged through simple reasoning.
New growth and expansion of existing operations is certain to create jobs related
to facilities and infrastructure construction and maintenance. Abandonment is
likely to have an opposite effect of equal magnitude. But, abandonment is also
likely to spur job creation through job destruction, particularly if there is a demand
for a low cost alternative to new construction and infrastructure development.
The changes specification allowed examination of asymmetrical effects
through decomposition of defense personnel changes into its positive, negative,
and BRAC related components. Ordinary indirect and induced effects that
accompany exogenous employment growth easily justify the +/+ hypothesis. The
-1+ proposition is defended through: (1 ) the labor force redistributive effect of
defense recruiting and attrition dynamics; (2) the community and public goods
infrastructure vacuum that accompanies military downsizing; and (3) the
countervailing employment effects of economic aid and reutilization efforts
targeted at base closure sites .
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There is evidence of an asymmetrical relationship between military
personnel level changes, and local community employment. Specifical ly,
coefficient estimates suggest the short and long run indirect and induced
employment effects of positive defense personnel increases on loca l non-farm
private employment are 0 .48 and 0.65, respectively. The corresponding
multipliers for military installation personnel increases, then, are 1 .48 and 1 .65.
With respect to ordinary personnel reductions, the short and long run coefficient
estimates are -0.68 and -0 .92, respectively. The inferred multipliers, then, are
0.32 and 0.08. I nterpreting this literally, in the short run, if one job is removed
from a base, the net loss to the community is: -1 defense worker
industry workers

= -

0.32 netjob loss (or -1 x 0.32

=

+

0.68 private

-0. 32) . Likewise, the

average estimated short and long run effects of personnel reductions for BRAC
locations are -0.82 and -1 . 1 0, respectively, which suggest multipliers of -0. 1 8 and
+0.1 0. However, care must be exercised in i nterpreting coefficient estimates for
negative personnel changes (ordinary and B RAC related}. Specifically, though
the corresponding variables were chosen to capture the effects of la bor force
supply side pressures and community and public goods infrastructure vacuums,
they also embody the effects of government outsourcing, and over one billion
dollars in federal relief targeted at B RAC communities across a window of 9
years. A weakness of this study is the a bsence of detailed data to control for
these two factors. For example, defense spending records that might capture the
extent of outsourcing at the local levels, reflect only the point of payment to prime
contractors, rather than the communities which derive employment benefits from
119

this spending. Regarding BRAC related fina ncial aid, effort was made to control
for this factor in the form of a base "closure clock" dummy variable regime. But
the broad assumption here is that aid was apportioned evenly across all B RAC
locations, under the same relative payout schedules. Naturally, the coefficients
for negative personnel changes reflect one or both of these flaws. Since both
these factors exert positive employment pressures, it is likely the estimated
employment effects of military downsizing (BRAC and ordinary) are upward
biased . This does not rule out support for asymmetrical employment effects
related to defense workforce dynamics. But it does suggest that a bsent similar
aid and outsourcing patterns, the estimated effects of downsizing are a bit
optimistic.
Of interest is the differential between coefficient estimates for ordinary
negative personnel changes and B RAC related personnel reductions.
Specifically, the favorable employment effects associated with B RAC reductions
were 20 percent greater than those estimated for ordinary downsizing. Again,
federal assistance is a likely contributor to this difference. But, in conjunction
with the positive and significant coefficient estimate for the installation and
facilities reutilization proxy, LANDCHGJ,t-3• this implies efforts to promote
conversion of public resources to private use were genera lly effective.
Though review of the literature, media, and defense records revealed only
anecdotal support for claims of delays in delivery of aid and conversion of
defense facilities, empirical results of the model corroborate these assertions.
Specifically, after considering various lags for the reutilization proxy,
1 20

LANDCHGJ.?. the three-year lag specification fit best with the remaining varia bles .
The implication is that on average, three years la psed between vacancy and the
final parceling of facilities for private reuse. Furthermore, significance and
magnitudes for the "closure clock" dummy regime suggest the effects of financial
aid and efforts to promote conversion kicked in on the second year, and reached
their peak by the fourth year, following selection for closure.
There is little support for the idea that defense employment impacts in
counties characterized by more specialized industry structures are dampened.
While this expectation is explicitly modeled, and the signs of the coefficient
estimates are as anticipated (with the exception of BRAC related personnel
reductions), in all cases they do not test significantly different from 0. On the
other hand, for BRAC related personnel reductions, there is evidence that
favorable employment effects are less pronounced in communities where overall
defense presence is also dwindling.
The idea of downsizing and closure is never appealing - particularly to
those whose jobs are being eliminated and the communities that host them. But,
in the case of DoD personnel and infrastructure reductions, the picture is not all
doom and gloom. For exa mple, the potential for reutilization of public assets
represents low cost alternatives to new construction for private industry. Off
base housing and infrastructure released to the community by departing
servicemen and women also present low cost expansion opportunities. Perhaps
those who suffer most are the landholders, whose property values may
depreciate in the wake of BRAC (as evidenced by programs to offset housing
1 21

sales losses sustained by defense personnel leaving closure communities) . But,
even this temporary setback serves to draw new growth and opportunity for the
effected community. Though there will always be an exception - individuals or
communities that suffer more than the results of this study suggest - these
exceptions must be balanced against the bigger picture: a Department of
Defense with a growing mission, constrained budgets, and aging, idle
infrastructure that is sapping much needed funds away from operations and
modernization . This study represents just one step toward reconciling those
competing concerns.
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Appendix A

-

PCI Growth as the Dependent Variable

Local employment effects of changes to defense operations are not the
only worry of political representatives, civic leaders, and residents of affected
communities . Resulting changes in the earnings of those left behind are also a
serious concern. Though the focus of this study is not with that concern, a rough
adaptation of the model on page 97 is explored to shed some light in this area .
Specifically, using the model in equation (1 2) , the percent change in per capita
income (PCIGROTHJt) is substituted as the dependent variable, while
PCIGROTHJ,t-2 is used as an instrumenta l variable for the lagged dependent
variable, PCIGROTHJ,t-t (IV denoted : PCIGROTH\t-t) . The purpose is not to
precisely model regional earnings growth, but rather to see how the previously
modeled employment determinants might influence income, with particular
attention given to the direction of defense personnel and installation reutilization
effects. The model is run in three variations, with defense personnel changes (1 )
aggregated into one variable (1 -way defense change); (2) decomposed into
positive and negative changes only (2-way defense change); and (3)
decomposed into positive changes, negative changes related to on-going

1 30

operations, and negative changes related to BRAC (3-way defense change) .
The outcomes for all three are presented in Table A-1 .
Of interest are the consistently positive coefficients for all the defense
personnel variables in all three models. In particular, defense personnel changes
(DEFCHGJt) in the 1 -way model, and positive defense personnel changes
(PDEFCHGJt) in the 2- and 3-way models are both positive and significant.
Looking at the DEFCHGJt coefficient in the 1 -way model, its value of 0.000003
seems to suggest an increase of 3, 3 1 0 military and federal civilian defense jobs
leads to regional per capita income growth of 1 %. Of course specification issues
and the possibility of omitted variable bias place the magnitudes of these
parameter estimates in question. But, the positive direction deserves attention
as it suggests defense personnel typically increase earnings averages for their
communities. This is consistent with the interpretation of the stand-alone
defense-to-labor force change variable, D2LFCHGJ,t-I. in the interaction model of
Table 1 3 (see related discussion, beginning on page 1 1 1 ) . These combined
results run counter to those of Hooker and Knetter. Specifically, Hooker and
Knetter (1 999) find local defense personnel decreases lead to per capita income
increases. It should be noted their study is restricted to a much smaller sampling
(Cal ifornia only) , and their coefficients do not test significantly d ifferent from 0 .
While it may be that i n a few high cost areas, military presence does indeed bring
down overall earnings averages, the results of this study suggest that on the
whole, just the opposite is true.

1 31

Table A

-

Changes Model with

PCI Growth as the Dependent Variable

Dependent Variable: PCIGROTH1t
Coeff
AJ

not shown

DEFCHG1t

0.000003

T-Stat

2.58

Coeff

T-Stat

Coeff

not shown

••

0.000005
0.000002

PDEFCHG1t
NDFCHG1t

not shown

2.67 ..
1 .1 7

BDEFCHG1,
DEFDV1
LANDCHG1.t-3
T01,
Tl jt
T21,
T31,
T41t
T 51t
STNRGYCH1,t-1
PPICHG1.t-t
SLGCHG1,
PCIMPLCH
PWRCHG1.t-1
PCFEACHGJ.t- 1
DNSITYCH1.t-1
PSRVCCHG1.t-1
POPECHG1.t-1
CSCHG1,t- 1
FARMCHG1,

-0.000284
0.000002
0.002563
-0.01 1 460
0.00531 7
-0.005809
0.001 968
-0.01 2042
0.001 623
-0.01 0502
0.000002
-0.000009
0.004364
-0.000081
-0.000052
-0.021 732
0.0031 85
0.093040
0.000007

-0.48
0.37
0.37
-1 .61
0.75
-0.67
0.23
-1 .06
1 .87
-9.87
3.05
-0.81
1 2.41
-2.87
0.00
-1 .31
0.25
5.1 2
2.88

PCIGROTH\t-1

(IV: PCIGROTHJ,t-2)

Final est. of Rho

-0.00001 8 - 3.69
-0. 2901 91 -73.50

••
••

••
••

••
••

••

=

3092; periods, T

Significant at the 95 percent level .

.. Significant at the 99 percent level.
Note:

-0.84
0.35
0.32
-1 .68
0.63
-0.82
0.1 4
-1 .1 2
1 .87
-9.87
2.93
-0.83
1 2.41
-2.87
-0.01
-1 .31
0.26
5.1 2
2.89

••
••

••
••

••
••

-0.00001 8 -3.69
-0.2901 99 -73 .50

••

(counties, n
•

-0.000521
0.000002
0.002 1 81
-0.01 1 990
0.004468
-0.0071 1 4
0.001 249
-0.01 2766
0.001 61 9
-0.01 0500
0.000002
-0.000009
0.004364
-0.000081
-0.000057
-0.021 673
0.003268
0.0931 24
0.000007

Models corrected for first order autocorrelation .
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T-Stat

=

19}

••

••

0.000005
0.000002
0.000001
-0.000494
0.000002
0.002306
-0.01 2398
0.003857
-0.008007
0.000662
-0.01 341 6
0.001 620
-0.010501
0.000002
-0.000009
0.004365
-0.000081
0.000097
-0.021 674
0.003267
0.0931 07
0.000007

2.68 ..
1 . 23
0.28
-0.79
0.32
0. 33
-1 .72
0.53
-0.88
0.08
-1 . 1 6
1 .87
-9.87 • •
2.94 ••
-0.83
1 2.41 • •
-2.87 ••
0.01
-1 .31
0.26
5.1 2 ••
2.89 ••

-0.00001 8 -3.69
-0.290201 -73.50

••

••

The other noteworthy results are the coefficient for the installation
reutilization proxy (LANDCHGJt) is positive in all three models, and that of the
defense county dummy variable, DEFDVJI is negative in a l l three. The
LANDCHGJt result implies reutilization has favorable effects on local earnings,
whereas the sign for DEFDVJ suggests, ceteris paribus, earnings growth in
defense counties trail that of non-defense counties. But, both these effects do
not test significantly different from 0.
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Appendix B

-

First Stage of Instrumental Variable Estimation

The equation estimated in the first stage of the 2SLS routine, when
EMPCHGJ.t-2 is the instrument for the lagged dependent variable EMPCHGJ.t-1.
follows:

EMPCHGJ.t-1

At
+ A.�1DEFCHGJt
+ A.�2DEFDVJ
+ A.�3LANDCHGJt
+ A.y1STNRGYCHJ.t-1
+ A.y2PPI CHGJ .t-1
+ A.y3SLGCHGJt
+ A.'Y4PCIMBPCHJ,t-1
+ A.ysPWRCHGJ,t-1
+ A.ysPCFEACHGJ.t-1
+ A.)'TDNSITYCHJ,t- 1
+ A.ysPSRVCCHGJ,t-1
+ A.ygPOPECHGJ.t-1
+ A.y10CSCHGJ.t-t
+ A.yuFARMCHGJt
+ (1 -A.) EMPCHGJ,t-2
+ eJt
=

(17)

Note that this first equation takes the same form as the original regression
model, with the exceptions that the lagged dependent varia ble is substituted for
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the dependent variable, and the instrument is substituted for the lagged
dependent variable. Results are summarized in Table B-1 . For the second
stage of the routine, fitted values of EMPCHGJ,t-I are derived from these estimated
coefficients, then substituted back into the original regression equation, yielding
the results presented in Table 8 on page 92.
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Table B First Stage Results from
Instrumental Variable Estimation
-

Dependent Variable:

EMPCHG.t.t-1

Coeff

T-Stat

not shown

At

-0. 1 8

DEFCHG1,

61 8 . 1 8

DEFDV1

0 . 86

LANDCHG1,
STNRGYCHI.t-1

-1 88.1 2

PPICHG u_ 1

-737 . 35
1 .83

SLGCHG1,

-3.38

••

1 8.20 ..
4.37

••

-4.62 ..
-1 4 . 4 3

••

60.96 . .
••

PCIMBPCH1.t-1

-2. 40

PWRCHG1.1-1

1 3.29

0.79

PCFEACHGu-1

-1 .22

-0.97

DNSITYCHI.t-1

81 30.73

1 3.70 ..

PSRVCCHGI.t-1

-258.46

-0. 3 4

-1 425. 66

-2.43

7208. 86

8 . 44

••

FARMCHG11

-0.43

-3.99

••

EMPCHG1.1-2

0.63

204. 64 ..

POPECHG u-1
CSCHG1,1- 1

(counties, n
•
••

=

-4.38

•

3092; periods, T = 19)

Significant at the 95 percent level.
Significant at the 99 percent level.
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Append ix C - Major BRAC Bases
First

Instal lation/City

Adak Naval Air Station
Fort Greely
Fort McClellan
Fort Chaffee
Ira Eaker Air Force Base
Williams Air Force Base
Alameda
Castle Air Force Base
El Toro Marine Corps Air Station
Fort Ord
George Air Force Base
Long Beach
March Air Force Base
Mare Island Naval Shipyard
Mather Air Force Base
McClellan Air Force Base
Norton Air Force Base
Oakland Military Complex
Onizuka Air Force Base
Port Hueneme
Sacramento
San Diego
San Francisco
Sierra Army Depot
Tustin Marine Corps Air Station
Aurora
Lowry Air Force Base
Pueblo
New London
Stratford
Cecil Field Naval Air Station
Homestead Air Force Base
Key West Naval Air Station
Orlando
Pensacola
Barbers Point Naval Air Station
Chanute Air Force Base
Fort Sheridan
Glenview
Savanna Army Depot

County

Juneau Borough
S.E. Fairbanks Census Area
Calhoun
Sebastian
Mississippi
Maricopa
Alameda
Merced
Orange
Monterey
San Bernardino
Los Angeles
Riverside
Solano
Sacramento
Sacramento
San Bernardino
Alameda
Santa Clara
Ventura
Sacramento
San Diego
San Francisco
Lassen
Orange
Arapahoe
Denver
Pueblo
New London
Fairfield
Duval
Miami-Dade
Monroe
Orange
Escambia
Honolulu
Champaign
Lake
Cook
Carroll
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BRAe•

State

1 995
1 995
1 995
1 995
1 991
1 991
1 993
1 991
1 993
1 991
1 988
1 991
1 993
1 993
1 988
1 995
1 988
1 993
1 995
1 993
1 991
1 993
1 988
1 995
1 991
1 995
1 991
1 988
1 995
1 995
1 993
1 993
1 995
1 993
1 993
1 993
1 988
1 988
1 993
1 995

AK
AK
AL
AR
AR
AZ
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

co
co
co

CT
CT
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
HI
IL
IL
IL
IL

Installation/City

Fort Benjamin Harrison
Grissom Air Force Base
Indianapolis
Jefferson Proving Ground
Lexington
Louisville
England Air Force Base
Fort Polk
Fort Devens
Watertown
Weymouth
Annapolis
Baltimore
Fort Ritchie
Loring Air Force Base
Detroit
K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base
Warren
Wurtsmith Air Force Base
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station
St. Louis
Pease Air Guard Station
Bayonne
Fort Dix
Fort Monmouth
Trenton
Bethpage
Fort Totten
Griffiss Air Force Base
New York
Plattsburgh Air Force Base
Senaca Army Depot (Romulus)
Kettering
Newark
Rickenbacker Air Force Base
Kelly Support Facility
Letterkenny Army Depot
Philadelphia Military Complex
Warminster
Charleston
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base
Memphis
Millington
Bergstrom Air Force Base
Carswell Air Force Base
Chase Field Naval Air Station
Dallas
Kelly Air Force Base
Red River Army Depot
Reese Air Force Base
Ogden

County

Marion
Miami
Marion
Jefferson
Fayette
Jefferson
Rapides
Vernon
Middlesex
Middlesex
Norfolk
Anne Arundel
Baltimore (Independent City)
Washington
Aroostook
Macomb
Marquette
Macomb
losco
Cass
St. Louis (Independent City)
Rockingham
Hudson
Burlington
Monmouth
Mercer
Nassau
Queens
Oneida
Richmond
Clinton
Seneca
Montgomery
Licking
Franklin
Westmoreland
Franklin
Philadelphia
Bucks
Charleston
Horry
Shelby
Shelby
Travis
Tarrant
Bee
Dallas
Bexar
Bowie
Lubbock
Weber
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First

BRAe•

State

1 991
1 991
1 995
1 988
1 988
1 995
1 991
1 991
1 991
1 988
1 995
1 995
1 995
1 995
1 991
1 993
1 993
1 995
1 991
1 991
1 995
1 988
1 995
1 988
1 993
1 993
1 995
1 995
1 993
1 993
1 993
1 995
1 993
1 993
1 991
1 995
1 995
1 991
1 995
1 993
1 991
1 995
1 993
1 991
1 991
1 991
1 993
1 995
1 995
1 995
1 995

IN
IN
IN
IN
KY
KY
LA
LA
MA
MA
MA
MD
MD
MD
ME
Ml
Ml
Ml
Ml
MO
MO
NH
NJ
NJ
NJ
NJ
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
OH
OH
OH
PA
PA
PA
PA
sc
sc

TN
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
UT

Installation/City

Tooele Army Depot
Cameron Station
Fort Pickett
Norfolk
Vent Hill Farm Stations (Warrenton)
Seattle

County

Tooele
Alexandria (Independent City)
Nottoway
Norfolk (Independent City)
Fauquier
King

First
BRAC*

State

1 993
1 988
1 995
1 993
1 993
1 988

UT
VA
VA
VA
VA
WA

• In a few cases bases were effected by more than one BRAC. In these instances, the date

reflects the first BRAC to impact the base.
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Appendix D - List of Acronyms
Acronym

AD
AFB
AFS
AGB
ARS
BEA
BLS
B RAC
CBO
CMSA
COBRA
C RS
DoD
DOE
DOL
E DA
EIA
FAA
GAO
KWH
LMI
MCAS
MSA
NAS
OEA
OSD
PMSA
QDR
REIS
RIMS

Full Text

Army Depot
Air Force Base
Air Force Station
Air Guard Base
Air Reserve Base
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Bureau of Labor and Statistics
Base Realignment and Closure
Congressional Budget Office
Consolidated Metropolita n Statistical Area
Cost of Base Realignment Action
Congressional Research Service
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Labor
Economic Development Administration
Energy Information Administration
Federal Aviation Administration
General Accounting Office
Kilowatt Hour
Logistics Management Institute
Marine Corps Air Station
Metropolitan Statistical Area
N aval Air Station
Office of Economic Adjustment
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area
Quadrennial Defense Review
Regional Economic Information System
Regional I nput-Output Modeling System
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Acronym

ROTC
SAF
SEPER
u.s.c.

U SDC

Full Text

Reserve Officer Training Corps
Secretary of the Air Force
State Energy Price and Expenditure Report
United States Code
United States Department of Commerce
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